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The traditional view of the federal administrative state imagines a bureaucracy
consisting entirely of executive agencies under the control of the President as well as
regulatory commissions and boards that are more independent of the White House.
Administrative law clings to this image, focusing almost entirely on these conventional agency forms. The classic image, however, is inaccurate. The reality of the
administrative state is more complex.
Contrary to the traditional view, a considerable bureaucracy exists outside of
executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions: the largest employer of
nonmilitary government employees, the U.S. Postal Service; the only major operator
of passenger trains in the country, Amtrak; the organization that ended the career of
cyclist Lance Armstrong, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency; the primary responder to
domestic emergencies, the National Guard; the major international lender to
developing countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
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a part of the World Bank group; and the federal government’s primary oversight
agency, the Government Accountability Office, are a few examples.
This bureaucracy lives largely at the boundaries. There are organizations at the
border between the federal government and the private sector. There are organizations
at the border between the federal government and other governments, including
those of states, foreign countries, and Native American tribes. And there are
organizations entirely within the federal government that do not fit squarely within
the Executive Branch, including but encompassing far more than independent
regulatory commissions and boards. The variety, number, and importance of these
organizations greatly complicate the structure of the federal bureaucracy as widely
perceived.
To widen the lens on the administrative state, while trying to retain some tractability, this Article locates and classifies the missing federal bureaucracy along the
borders of more conventional categories and other important boundaries. In
addition to placing these missing parts on the bureaucratic map, it also considers
movement to and from the center of these categories. The heart of this Article
theorizes about these missing components, specifically why political actors would
create bureaucracy at the boundary. Under the theory advanced here—and
seemingly in reality—these entities are actually the ordinary outcome of the agency
design process. This Article also considers whether their creation serves social
welfare or democratic legitimacy objectives, suggesting that efficiency may not
always trump accountability in these alternative agency structures. Finally, this
Article examines important legal issues surrounding these other bureaucracies and how
these entities might shape established law and governance of federal agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) multi-billion dollar losses and its plan
to stem them, in part, by ending the delivery of letters on Saturday grabbed
newspaper headlines and elicited dismay from politicians.1 Politicians, in

1 See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Trying to Stem Losses, Post Office Seeks to End Saturday Letter Delivery,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2013, at A15. Weeks later, because of Congress’s disapproval, the USPS
retreated from this proposal. Pauline Jelinek, Post Office Retreats on Eliminating Saturday Mail, BIG
STORY (Apr. 10, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-newsalert-313.
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particular, appreciated that the USPS is “the only federal agency with which
most people directly interact almost every day”—at least as recipients of
mail.2 Even now, with email and other forms of communication having taken
over many of the functions once served by the mail, the USPS is the largest
governmental employer of civilians and the second largest civilian employer
of any kind (after Wal-Mart) in the United States.3 Politicians, economists,
and ordinary citizens see the USPS as a major part of American life.
Public law presumes to differ from this central treatment of the USPS,
offering virtually no place for the agency as it has been organized since 1971.
This was not always the case. The old Post Office still appears in the study
of modern administrative law. As the nation’s second oldest agency, after the
Army, it predated the Declaration of Independence and continued uninterrupted under the Constitution.4 For close to 150 years, the head of the Post
Office had Cabinet-level status, as the heads of the Environmental Protection
Agency and a few other entities do today. Until 1971, it was a classic executive agency with “purely executive officers,”5 whom the President could fire
for any reason. Indeed, its pre-1971 form serves as a benchmark in case law
from which to measure the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other
independent regulatory commissions (IRCs).6
After millions of pieces of mail became stuck in the Chicago Post Office
in October 1966,7 the Commission on Postal Reorganization called for the
postal service to be refashioned as a government-owned corporation.8 The
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 implemented that recommendation, creating

2 R. Richard Geddes, Policy Watch: Reform of the U.S. Postal Service, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2005, at 217, 218. To be sure, with electronic communication, texting, social media, and
online bill paying as partial substitutes, we send and receive less mail nowadays. See Ron Nixon, As
Default Looms, Postal Service Sees Deeper Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at A14 (noting a six-year
decline in mail volume).
3 Richard R. John, Op-Ed., How the Post Office Made America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2013, at A19.
4 The Continental Congress named Benjamin Franklin Postmaster General in 1775. He was
still in the position when the Declaration of Independence was signed, making him the country’s
first head of the posts. U.S. POSTAL SERV., THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 1775-2006, at 6 (2007), available at http://about.usps.com/publications/
pub100.pdf.
5 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
6 See id. at 627-29 (distinguishing the duties of a postmaster and a commissioner of FTC in
assessing removal restrictions on the latter).
7 U.S. POSTAL S ERV., supra note 4, at 38.
8 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON POSTAL ORG., TOWARDS POSTAL EXCELLENCE: T HE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON POSTAL ORGANIZATION 1-2 (1968). The
Commission was created in response to the Chicago disaster. It rejected both minor modifications
to its current Cabinet department form (because of the mission of the agency) as well as complete
privatization (because of financial concerns). Id. at 2.
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the USPS as an organization with public and private sector characteristics.9
Accordingly, its staffing and leadership structure combine both.10 Funding,
too, comes from both governmental and private market sources. 11 The
USPS is running large deficits, and before 2013 had failed, for the second
time, to make a legally required, $5.5 billion pension payment.12
The current manifestation of the post office, with both its public and
private elements, is largely absent from administrative law. The change in
its structure, from a Cabinet department to a government corporation, is
also largely absent. 13 Like a Cabinet agency or independent regulatory
commission or board—the two kinds of institutions acknowledged by the
classic understanding of the federal regulatory state—the USPS is a state
actor under the Constitution and is subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).14 Fraud against it is considered to be fraud against the federal

9 Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 201, 84 Stat. 719, 720.
10 Postal workers are still federal employees. U.S. P OSTAL SERV., supra note

4, at 40. A
chief executive officer, the Postmaster General, is chosen and overseen by a board of directors, the
Board of Governors, much like in the private sector. 39 U.S.C. §§ 202–203 (2006). The Board of
Governors, who select the Postmaster General, are themselves selected by the President and
subject to Senate confirmation rather than elected by shareholders. Id. § 202.
11 Mostly, the USPS relies on private consumers, charging them for its services. It receives
direct congressional appropriations only for services for the blind and overseas military personnel.
Ben White, Q&A, Getting the Lowdown on the People Who’ve Got Mail, WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2001, at A13. On the other hand, it can borrow funds from the Treasury Department. Id. The
USPS’s hybrid status includes significant competitive advantages and disadvantages. The USPS
has a government-granted monopoly on delivery of first-class letters. Id. It “pays no state or
federal taxes and does not have to license or tag its huge fleet of trucks.” Id. In exchange for these
advantages, however, it must provide mail service to every address in the country. Id. It also has to
meet government-imposed payment schedules for pensions and health benefits that are more
onerous than those facing the private sector or other governmental entities. See, e.g., Kevin C.
Brown, Congress Ties Postal Service into Knots, REMAPPING DEBATE (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.remappingdebate.org/article/congress-ties-postal-service-knots (noting that the 2005
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act requires the USPS to pay significant retiree health
benefits on an aggressive ten-year timeline).
12 GENE L. DODARO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-347T, U.S.
POSTAL SERVICE: URGENT ACTION NEEDED TO ACHIEVE FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 2
(2013). Since Fiscal Year 2006, the USPS has lost (in net) over $40 billion. Id.
13 Some believe that such movement in “the fundamental structures of government departments” does not occur, or at least not frequently. A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government
Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 546.
14 See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2013 WL 6212053, at *1-2 (9th Cir.
Nov. 27, 2013) (assuming without discussion that the USPS was a state actor and rejecting several
constitutional challenges to the USPS’s decision to use “single-point delivery rather than
centralized delivery” for hotel tenants); Top Choice Distribs., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 138 F.3d
463, 465 (2d Cir. 1998) (assessing whether USPS action was a “final agency decision” under the
APA); cf. Silver v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1036-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (analyzing
the appointment of USPS officials under the Appointments Clause).
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government. 15 Yet unlike almost all of those structures, the USPS has
independent litigating authority with regard to its rate-making activities.16
Its process for appointing leaders also fits somewhat uncomfortably with the
requirements of the Appointments Clause, which mandates that a principal
officer be selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate and an
inferior officer be selected the same way unless Congress chooses one of
three alternatives, including to be picked by the head of a department.17 In
addition, it functions in many ways as a corporation; symbolically, its
primary web address ends in “.com.”18 Despite its hybrid qualities, because
it remains a critical component of the federal bureaucracy, the modern post
office’s absence from the attention of administrative law seems surprising.
This Article examines the considerable bureaucracy, including the
USPS, that is neither an executive agency nor an independent regulatory
commission, yet is still at least partially federal. Other examples include the
only major operator of passenger trains in the country, Amtrak (officially
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation); the organization that ended
the career of cyclist Lance Armstrong, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency; the
primary responder to domestic emergencies, the National Guard; the major
international lender to developing countries, part of the World Bank
(officially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD)); and the federal government’s primary oversight agency, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO). Most of these entities have
significant ties to the federal government, but they reside at the border
between the federal government and either the private sector or another
government, whether state, foreign, or Native American tribal. And there
are organizations entirely within the federal government that do not fit
squarely within the Executive Branch, including but encompassing far more
than independent regulatory commissions and boards. In short, this Article
15 See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006) (imposing liability on persons
who defraud the government); Annys Shin, Justice Department Joins Whistleblower Lawsuit Against
Lance Armstrong, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-22/
local/37236356_1_tailwind-sports-armstrong-attorney-robert-luskin-johan-bruyneel (describing a suit
against former USPS-sponsored cyclist Lance Armstrong under the False Claims Act).
16 Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 306-10 (1993).
17 A divided Ninth Circuit panel upheld the USPS in the face of an Appointments Clause
challenge by finding the Postmaster General to be an inferior officer and construing the postal
service as an executive department with the nine postal governors acting as its head. Silver, 951
F.2d at 1036-41.
18 The USPS also controls http://www.usps.gov, but that address redirects the user instantly
to http://www.usps.com. Cf. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 675 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (listing Amtrak’s “.com” website as an argument in support of characterizing it as
private).
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takes what appears to exist on the margins, both in the structure of the
administrative state and in scholarship, and makes it more central to the
modern bureaucracy.
Legal scholars generally ignore such entities, except for fleeting references or particular categories in isolation.19 They have paid some attention
to government corporations and other quasi-agencies at the public–private
border.20 There has also been some writing on interstate compact agencies
at the federal–state border 21 and on international organizations at the

19 For rare exceptions, see JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASIGOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC
CONTROL (2003) (introducing a range of boundary organizations but focusing on public–private
entities); DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (2012) (surveying a wide range of
agencies); SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT: EVOLUTION AND TRENDS 42-58 (Comm. Print 1980)
(prepared by Ronald C. Moe, Cong. Research Serv.) [hereinafter MOE] (same); Hari M. Osofsky
& Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013) (focusing on hybrid
entities in energy policy); and Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (same).
20 See, e.g., JERRY MITCHELL, T HE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS (1999) (evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of government corporations);
GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 9 (2013) (examining the proliferation of
the “public authority” as “a result of preexisting institutional arrangements, ad hoc choices, and
political conflicts”); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century (discussing the
collapse of the public–private distinction in regulation), in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE L AW 90 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997); Jack M. Beermann, The Reach of Administrative Law in
the United States (examining administrative law of government corporations), in THE PROVINCE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra, at 171; William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson,
Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2013) (analyzing self-regulatory organizations
(SROs)); Froomkin, supra note 13 (examining a wide range of issues connected to government
corporations); Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008) (analyzing SROs); Paul E.
Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317 (2009)
(examining jurisdictional issues related to government corporations). For an extended treatment
of the legal issues surrounding one organization arguably on the public–private border, see A.
Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the
Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin, Wrong Turn]. For a fascinating recent
paper on classic executive agencies using market devices, see Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s
Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023 (2013). These efforts by classic agencies could be seen as moving those
organizations closer to the public–private boundary. There is also comparative work on these
public–private entities. See, e.g., Sandra Van Thiel, Comparing Agencies Across Countries (highlighting
characteristics of such entities across a range of countries), in GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:
PRACTICES AND LESSONS FROM 30 C OUNTRIES 18 (Koen Verhoest et al. eds., 2012).
21 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency,
49 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (examining the legality and desirability of interstate compacts).
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federal–foreign border.22 To be sure, there is a cottage industry of articles
that address independent regulatory commissions and boards—such as the
FTC—which exist at the boundary of the Executive Branch (or, according to
some, at the boundary between the Executive and Legislative Branches).23
More recently, there has been an increasing focus on organizations that
work across boundaries. For instance, many examine executive agencies and
private firms in the new governance literature24 and separate federal and
state agencies in federalism work. 25 This literature assumes there is a

22 See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO , TAMING
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD

GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ORDER (2012) (raising concerns with international organizations from a formalist perspective); Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The
Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 517 (2013) (examining legal issues surrounding the
World Bank); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000) (noting legal issues with international
organizations from a formalist perspective).
23 For a recent treatment, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing a range of attributes that make agencies
more insulated); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence,
63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010) (discussing, in the financial regulatory context, how independent
agencies are still responsive to the President); and Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013) (challenging the
binary view of agencies as either independent or executive). For a classic treatment in law, see
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 592 (1984) (highlighting the blurred nature of political control exercised
over independent regulatory commissions like the FTC), and for a classic treatment in political
science, see DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003).
24 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006) (discussing how agencies use
private entities to regulate and considering the legal consequences); Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (same); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004) (praising new governance regimes); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003) (noting concerns with new
governance regimes); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029 (2005) (using environmental regulatory regimes to demonstrate the influence of private
parties in “second-order agreements” with the federal regulatory state). There is also an older
literature on how public agencies and interest groups interact. See, e.g., GRANT MCCONNELL,
PRIVATE POWER & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966) (noting the role of private interests in
public lands policy).
25 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (examining the role
of states implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the larger legal
implications); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011)
(demonstrating how states enforce federal law); Josh Bendor & Miles Farmer, Note, Curing the
Blind Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework for State Agencies Implementing
Cooperative Federalism Statutes, 122 YALE L.J. 1280 (2013) (analyzing whether deference should be given
to state agency interpretations of federal law). Some of this work mentions combined federal–state
entities in passing.
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dividing line between the various categories and focuses on cooperation
across that line. There is little attention, however, more broadly on organizations along various boundaries. I examine entities on these lines.
The lack of systematic attention may arise for several reasons. To start,
these entities may not be as familiar as other agencies. Some of what they
do—for example, guaranteeing mortgages and running airports—does not
fall into the classic rulemaking and adjudicating functions spelled out in the
APA and major administrative law cases. And their more “conventional”
actions might not get as much attention.
In addition, the lack of systematic attention to boundary entities might
arise from the difficulty in categorizing them, despite their abundance in the
federal bureaucracy. The U.S. Government Manual (the Manual), the
official compilation of federal organizations,26 dedicates three of its seven
categories to boundary entities: independent agencies and government
corporations, quasi-official agencies, and international organizations.27 Aside
from classic independent regulatory commissions such as the FTC, the
current edition of the Manual lists more than a dozen other independent
agencies and government corporations, including the USPS and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).28 The Smithsonian and three
other bodies make up the four quasi-official entities; the IBRD and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are two of the thirteen primary
international organizations.29
Even these three categories themselves understate the prevalence of
boundary organizations because entities lurk in the remaining four categories
as well, such as the GAO in the Legislative Branch grouping and the United
States Sentencing Commission in the Judicial Branch section. Finally, the
Manual maintains a separate list of “boards, commissions, councils, etc., not
listed elsewhere in the Manual . . . whose functions are not strictly limited to
the internal operations of a parent department or agency and which are
authorized to publish documents in the Federal Register.”30
The inattention may also stem from the mistaken perception that many
of these organizations were formed recently. As issues become more
26 William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095, 1097
n.1 (2002) (“The [Manual], which is put out by the National Archives and Records Administration, catalogues the most important agencies in the federal government.”).
27 OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., T HE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, at v-ix (rev. July 2012) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT
MANUAL].
28 Id. at viii-ix.
29 Id. at ix.
30 Id. at 487-91.
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complicated and citizens more leery of centralized governmental remedies,
such entities presumably will proliferate.31 But these organizational forms
are not modern creations. The First Bank of the United States, one of the
first organizations at the public–private edge, was established in 1791; the
Second Bank followed in 1816.32 The National Guard, at the federal–state
border, dates to the American colonies;33 the Smithsonian to 1846;34 and the
GAO to 1921.35 In fact, even early purely federal agencies had nonfederal
elements.36
Finally, the lack of focus may derive from the mistaken assumption that
they contribute in minor ways to modern governance. Not only are these
often longstanding organizations numerous and diverse in structure, but many
also play critical roles in the administrative state. The wide scope of authority
delegated to independent regulatory commissions is well recognized. But the
less discussed border agencies also have considerable power. For example,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), fund “more than 75 percent of U.S. mortgages.”37 This makes
GSEs “among the largest financial institutions in the United States.”38 The
Export-Import Bank, a government corporation, finances over $24 billion in
loan guarantees and insurance annually, with its authority recently increased
to $120 billion.39 The National Guard staffs response teams to state and
31 See MITCHELL, supra note 20, at xv, 130; cf. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established
by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1235-36
(2000) (noting a trend toward centralization of the administrative state as well as an increase in
public–private entities, to the extent that there is independence).
32 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 860 (1824).
33 History, ARMY NAT’L GUARD, http://www.arng.army.mil/aboutus/history/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
34 About Us, SMITHSONIAN, http://www.si.edu/About (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
35 GAO at a Glance, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/
gglance.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
36 See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (2012) (noting that until 1853 “the Attorney
General of the United States was expected to and did maintain an active private law practice”).
37 Evan Weinberger, Obama Says US Mortgage Market Still Needs Backstop, LAW360 (Aug. 6,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/463031/obama-says-us-mortgage-market-still-needs-backstop; see
also Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Reality Catches Up to Public Administration
Theory, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 632, 632 (2009).
38 Ronald C. Moe, The Emerging Federal Quasi-Government: Issues of Management and Accountability, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 290, 294 (2001).
39 See SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42472, EXPORT -IMPORT BANK :
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 7-8 & tbl.2 (2012) (noting a total of almost $33 billion
authorized for all credit and insurance support); David Nakamura, Export-Import Bank Charter
Extended, WASH. POST, May 31, 2012, at A10 (noting that the Bank’s financing authority will
increase further to $140 billion). Even in 1988, “the outstanding credit assistance and insurance
provided by [federal government corporations] . . . [was] about $5 trillion.” Froomkin, supra note
13, at 550.
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national emergencies, such as natural disasters, and contributes personnel to
armed conflicts overseas. The GAO regularly rules on multi-million dollar
government procurement disputes.40
The variety, number, and importance of these organizations greatly
complicate the classic image of the federal administrative state—that of a
bureaucracy consisting almost entirely of executive agencies and independent
regulatory commissions. It might be simplest, yet still of interest, to use
these cross-border organizations to help us better analyze executive agencies
and independent regulatory commissions. After all, we tend to define
independent regulatory commissions and boards in opposition to executive
agencies. What would happen if we view these agencies in comparison to
organizations perceived to be less central to the Executive Branch? This
Article takes up that question. It also considers why these boundary entities
exist, both as a positive and normative matter.
These inquiries are static. In other words, they assume agencies are of a
particular type, neither moving toward the center nor toward the boundary.
Agencies, however, do move. This movement is also largely ignored in the
literature. It may be most common for agencies to migrate from the center
to the boundary over time, as the USPS has done, but movement can also
occur toward the Executive Branch. Research that considers agency design
dynamically typically examines the creation and destruction of bureaucratic
entities41 or the consolidation of agencies.42 This Article targets a related,
but distinct, question: Why do agencies shift form? This Article thus
examines the centripetal and centrifugal forces on agency design once
organizations have been established.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain what unifies this
inquiry, classify boundary organizations along three dimensions—between
the federal government and the private sector (for-profit and nonprofit),
across levels of government, and within the federal government—and
provide examples. I also define dynamic categories, corresponding to centralizing and diverging shifts in agency form, and offer some recent cases.

40 See KATE M. MANUEL & MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40228,
GAO BID PROTESTS: AN OVERVIEW OF TIME FRAMES AND PROCEDURES 1 (2011); infra
subsection I.D.3.
41 See, e.g., David E. Lewis, The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency
Immortality, 64 J. POL. 89 (2002).
42 See, e.g., MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, G OVERNING SECURITY: THE HIDDEN
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SECURITY AGENCIES (2013); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1655 (2006).
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I then turn in Part II to the heart of this Article: positive and normative
theories for the creation of boundary organizations and their movement
over time. By positive, I mean a theory that explains why politicians create
such entities. Political science scholarship has examined the quest for
political control as the primary reason politicians create such entities, but
political control over an organization is not the only driver of agency
design. I then offer two different normative theories behind the creation of
boundary agencies: one that analyzes when such organizations promote
social welfare and one that examines when these entities foster democratic
legitimacy. I suggest that boundary entities, in some cases, might sacrifice
the goals of both efficiency and accountability that shape agency design.
In Part III, I consider the legal implications of boundary organizations,
both as a matter of constitutional and statutory law. These organizations
raise complicated constitutional and statutory issues. In July 2013, the D.C.
Circuit struck down part of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, which tasked Amtrak with developing performance
measures, as an unconstitutional delegation to a private entity.43 In 1995,
however, the Supreme Court had found that Amtrak was a governmental
entity for First Amendment purposes. 44 At best, the legal patchwork
suggests exceptional complexity; at worst, it is inconsistent.
In addition, I use boundary entities as a lens to reexamine some classic
administrative law doctrines about more centrally located agencies. Those
doctrines are premised in part on a fictional administrative state that only
considers executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions.
These conventional, but not necessarily typical, agencies may have created too
much emphasis on particular forms of agency decisionmaking (such as rulemaking) and specific rationales for deference (such as political accountability).
I. SCOPE OF INQUIRY AND CLASSIFICATION OF
BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS
This Article examines boundary organizations, where one piece of the
entity is some part of the federal government as a formal matter. Almost all
of these organizations look like agencies in some respect. Not all entities
that have bureaucratic elements fall under this definition, however. For the
purposes of this Article, the organization has to have federal ties; thus,
entities at the border of local governments and private business, such as

43
44

Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995).
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Business Improvement Districts, do not fit within this Article’s framework.45
The ties also cannot be entirely contractual or funding based.46 Although
such organizations raise a number of interesting issues, including some that
overlap with the ones this Article tackles, I do not address those types of
entities. The organizations this Article addresses need exist at only one
border, but they could function at more.47
I focus here on formal or structural attributes of organizations, including
agency design and assigned functions.48 Of course, leaders matter.49 History
and practice also matter.50 I limit my attention to these less subjective and
more formalist, structural elements in order to gain some descriptive and
predictive traction. Most critically, political scientists have concluded that
agency structure has “serious implications for policy outputs.”51
In this Part, I begin by defending the scope of the inquiry. I then describe
three categories of federal boundary organizations: (1) those connected to
the federal government but operating in the private (including nonprofit)
sector; (2) those tied closely to the federal government but spanning
another type of government or sovereign, including states, foreign countries,
and Native American tribes; and (3) those located entirely within the
45 This Article also excludes agencies arguably at the boundary of different state branches of
government.
46 Thus, purely private entities that have been delegated work by the government, such as
privately run prisons for defendants convicted of federal crimes, do not fit within the scope of this
Article, even if that work is inherently governmental in nature.
47 Cf. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 19 (examining hybrid institutions that typically exist within a regional space between state, local, and federal governance
levels and allow stakeholders to meaningfully participate in decisionmaking processes). Some of
the boundary organizations described later in this Article operate on multiple borders, such as the
GAO and the Federal Reserve, but most exist only on one.
48 These characteristics are typically detailed in a statute, or, alternatively, a presidential
directive or other founding document.
49 See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY I NNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–
1928 (2001) (arguing that specific mid-level officials are responsible for certain successes in
bureaucratic policy innovation).
50 The Federal Reserve’s independence derives in large part from history and practice. See
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2013)
(“Contrary to a widespread belief, no rule of written law prevents Presidents from firing the Chair
of the Federal Reserve (‘Fed Chair’), the nation’s independent central bank.”).
51 AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND
NSC 1 (1999). Institutional structure of agencies can, for example, “shape the preferences of
interest groups.” Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests: The
Case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 468, 472 (2001). Other efforts to
classify bureaucratic entities therefore also rely on their structure. See MOE, supra note 19, at 21
(“[T]here is an underlying assumption motivating this taxonomic exercise; namely, that the
organizational behavior of units of Government may be partially explained by their structural
characteristics.”).
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federal government but not fitting squarely in only one of its branches. I
also detail two distinct dynamic narratives about changing agency form:
moving toward and moving away from these types of boundaries. The initial
purpose is descriptive; I take up questions of creation, desirability, and
legality in later Parts.
A. Scope of Inquiry
We usually think of the federal government as being distinct from private
organizations and other governments. In addition, we tend to view the
branches of the federal government as separate categories. While we
recognize connections between these categories, it is mostly in terms of an
organization in one category interacting with an organization in another
category (or one branch checking another).52 We rarely think of organizations in the interstices of these categories. The approach here to examine
the bureaucracy at these boundaries is not without difficulty. While the
project’s scope could be seen as gathering all organizations that are not in
the center of these categories, this Article does not construe the scope in
purely negative terms. In fact, this project is ultimately a positive exploration
into the organizational forms of the federal bureaucracy and the underlying
reasons for these structures.53
The dissection along various borders depends on some critical assumptions. To start, the borders are predetermined: between public and private,
between federal and foreign, between federal and state, between federal and
tribal, and between any two branches of the federal government. They capture
the primary edges of the federal government and provide some tractability for
dividing entities. Some borders may be more important than others.
In addition, the classification is not precise. One could imagine a list of
characteristics that may be relevant to whether an organization is a boundary
entity, as opposed to one within a central category. The factors used to
assess this might include how the organization’s leaders are selected,54 how
52 See Freeman, supra note 24, at 641 (noting that classic agencies “rely significantly on outside
experts, advisory panels, and scientific advisors” for internal processes).
53 I do not limit my examination to boundary organizations that perform traditional agency
tasks, such as rulemaking and adjudication. Such a limit would not allow reconsideration of the
image pervasively drawn of the administrative state, as it assumes that the administrative state
primarily engages in those tasks. Rather, my approach is to dissect the federal bureaucracy that we
tend to ignore and to examine how it relates to the agencies we pay more attention to, and then to
consider the implications for administrative law and governance.
54 See David J. Barron, Foreward: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an
Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1121-33 (2008) (discussing selection
processes for various agencies).
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the leaders can be removed,55 how the organization is financed,56 whether
the organization has independent litigating authority,57 whether the organization has to submit to certain presidential directives58 or certain forms of
congressional oversight, 59 whether particular agency statutes apply, and
which entities can exercise veto authority over the organization’s decisions.
If an organization differs from classic executive agencies on a certain
number of these characteristics, it would then be labeled a boundary entity.
I do not attempt such a detailed exploration here. Rather, these characteristics
provide a broad division of entities with some entities closer to the center of
a category and others closer to one of the boundaries.60
B. Between the Federal Government and the Private Sector
The next three subsections detail the three major categories of federal
boundary organizations. This Section describes entities on the boundary
between the federal government and the nongovernmental sectors, most
commonly the private, for-profit sector. These diverse organizations can be
divided into two broad categories: purely governmental organizations,
including federal corporations, and quasi-governmental agencies encompassing seven different types of organizations: quasi-official agencies, GSEs,
federally funded research and development centers, agency-related nonprofit organizations, venture capital vehicles, congressionally chartered
nonprofit organizations, and instrumentalities of indeterminate character.
Because there is no settled official division of these public–private entities,61

55 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 23, at 786-92 (listing various agencies and their removal
protection); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 76 (2013) (concluding
that removal questions are best left to the political process).
56 See Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact
of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1824 (2012)
(examining the effect of congressional and presidential controls on the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
57 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent
Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 280 (1994) (noting independent agency authority to
litigate matters before the Supreme Court is the exception rather than the rule).
58 See Barron, supra note 54, at 1105-21 (outlining and describing regulatory review by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
59 See LEWIS & S ELIN, supra note 19, at 120-25 (discussing Congress’s use of hearings and
Inspectors General).
60 I am also leaving aside the variation within certain “centers,” such as the variation among
Cabinet departments or among private entities. Cf. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE (1996) (considering variation within the private sector).
61 See infra note 65 and accompanying text (highlighting that various governmental bodies
define these entities differently).
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I follow the classification of these agencies by the Congressional Research
Service (CRS).62
1. Government at the Private Border
There is no established definition of a government corporation in federal
law; sometimes the corporation has to be entirely owned by the United
States, but other times a corporation just partially owned by the government will qualify.63 The CRS defines it as “an agency of the federal government, established by Congress to perform a public purpose, which
provides a market-oriented product or service and is intended to produce
revenue that meets or approximates its expenditures.”64 According to the CRS,
seventeen organizations met this definition, including the USPS, as of 2011.65
Generally, a government corporation is headed by a CEO who is responsible to a full-time board of directors selected by political leaders.66 The
Government Corporation Control Act, which “standardized budget, auditing,
debt management, and depository practices,” applies to many, but not all, of
these entities.67 Some government corporations, such as Amtrak, take direct
government funding.68 Others started with congressional appropriations but
are now self-sustaining, or have been self-sustaining since their inception.69

62 KEVIN R. K OSAR, CONG. RESEARCH S ERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT :
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND P RIVATE SECTOR LEGAL
CHARACTERISTICS (2011) [hereinafter KOSAR, QUASI GOVERNMENT]; KEVIN R. KOSAR,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30365, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW (2011) [hereinafter KOSAR, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS].
63 KOSAR, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, supra note 62, at 2.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 15. In contrast, the GAO relies on self-reports to classify entities as government
corporations and consequently arrives at a different total. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-14, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 2, 7-8 (1995). The GAO does not
count the USPS as a government corporation. Id. at 2 & n.4. Irrespective of the definition, the
government corporation is a longstanding agency form dating to the takeover of the Panama
Railroad Company in 1903. MITCHELL, supra note 20, at 24-25.
66 MOE, supra note 19, at 44. But see KOSAR, FEDERAL G OVERNMENT CORPORATIONS,
supra note 62, at 9-10 (listing exceptions to this general structure).
67 KOSAR, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, supra note 62, at 4.
68 U.S. GOV’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-978SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 15-64 (3d ed. 2008).
69 The Export-Import Bank, for instance, has returned money to the Treasury since Fiscal
Year 2008. ILIAS, supra note 39, at 2. Additionally, OPIC must run on a “self-sustaining basis.”
SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-567, T HE OVERSEAS PRIVATE
INVESTMENT C ORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE I SSUES 5, 10 (2013).
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2. Quasi-Government at the Private Border
The remaining sets of entities that straddle the federal–private boundary
are less governmental in nature. Quasi-official agencies, an official category
within the U.S. Government Manual and the first category of quasigovernment organizations, are arguably the most like completely federal
entities. The Manual lists four such entities: the Legal Services Corporation,
the Smithsonian Institution, the State Justice Institute, and the United
States Institute of Peace.70 These organizations have some classic governmental duties. For example, they have to publish information on their
activities in the Federal Register.71 Their funding mostly comes from the
federal government.72 All but the Smithsonian are run by boards of directors
made up of Senate-confirmed presidential appointees.73 But these organizations are not considered executive agencies as that term is often defined in
federal law.74
The second type of quasi-government organizations, GSEs, also lack a
settled definition.75 Some GSEs, such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) are remarkably powerful entities. While they are privately
owned and run by a board of directors, do not have government-paid
employees, and cannot exercise government powers or commit the government financially, they make loans or loan guarantees for purposes determined by Congress, and their obligations are implicitly guaranteed by the
government.76

70
71
72

GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 27, at ix, 493-511.
KOSAR, QUASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 6.
GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 27, at 493, 497, 510, 511. The Smithsonian has faced
congressional pressure to raise more of its own funds. Robin Pogrebin, Smithsonian Chooses a New
Director, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at N26.
73 The Smithsonian’s Board of Regents is composed of the Chief Justice of the United States,
the Vice President, six members of Congress, and nine members chosen by a joint congressional
resolution. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 27, at 493, 497, 509, 511.
74 See 5 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“For the purpose of [Title 5], ‘Executive agency’ means an
Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.”). Thus,
these quasi-official organizations are not subject to, for example, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). Id. § 552.
75 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 7; see also 2 U.S.C. § 622(8) (2012)
(defining GSE for budgetary purposes).
76 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 7-8; see also Breger & Edles, supra note
31, at 1232 (noting that GSEs operate under federal charters as opposed to articles of incorporation). Until it turned into a private company, Sallie Mae was a sixth GSE. Thomas H. Stanton,
The Life Cycle of the Government-Sponsored Enterprise: Lessons for Design and Accountability, 67 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 837, 837 (2007).

858

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 841

Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), the
third type of quasi-government agency, have fewer governmental connections than quasi-official agencies and GSEs. The Lincoln Laboratory, which
is part of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is funded by the
Defense Department, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which is funded
by the Energy Department, are two examples.77 Rather than sharing a profit
motive with GSEs, FFRDCs are nonprofit corporations. They receive
federal funds to do work for particular government agencies, mostly defense
related, and they typically do not have to compete for federal funding with
other research centers.78 According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation,
agencies can use FFRDCs for “some special long-term research or development need [that] cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or
contractor resources.”79 Some FFRDCs are restricted from taking nonfederal
money.80 In Fiscal Year 2010, the government spent $16.8 billion on these
FFRDCs; this included over $1 billion from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.81
Other nonprofit corporations exist at the border of the federal government. The fourth category under quasi-government, agency-related nonprofit corporations, describes these entities. Although these entities have
some legal connection to a traditional federal agency, the scope of that
connection can vary widely.82 The CRS, therefore, breaks this category into
three subgroups: (1) adjunct organizations under a federal agency’s control;
(2) organizations independent of, but dependent upon, a federal agency; and
(3) nonprofit organizations voluntarily affiliated with a federal agency.83 Only
the first two fall under the boundary organizations used in this Article.84
Congress creates (or permits an agency to create) entities in the first
group of agency-related nonprofit corporations—adjunct organizations
under a federal agency’s control—to “perform functions that the [agency]
77 NAT’L S CIENCE F OUND., MASTER G OVERNMENT LIST OF FEDERALLY FUNDED
R&D CENTERS (FFRDCS) (2013), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/agency.cfm.
78 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 10-11.
79 48 C.F.R. § 35.017 (2012).
80 RONDA BRITT, NAT’L S CIENCE FOUND., 12-315, ARRA FUNDING RAISES R&D
EXPENDITURES WITHIN FEDERALLY FUNDED R&D CENTERS 11% TO $16.8 BILLION IN
FY 2010, at 2 n.3 (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf12315/nsf12315.pdf.
81 Id. at 1. This funding made up 97.3% of these entities’ expenditures in the same period. Id.
82 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 12.
83 Id.
84 Unlike the organizations in the other two groups, entities in the third category are not
created under federal law. Rather, they are created entirely under state (or D.C.) law. Id. at 18. For
instance, Congress tasked the National Park Foundation to “assist in the creation of local nonprofit
support organizations” but allowed nonprofits to affiliate voluntarily as “Park Partners.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 19o (2012).
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itself finds difficult to integrate into its regular policy and financial processes,”
such as accepting charitable donations.85 The National Park Foundation is
one example.86 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
incorporated under D.C. law as a nonprofit corporation, is another example.87
Congress also creates (or permits an agency to create) members in the
second group of agency-related nonprofit corporations: organizations
independent of, but dependent upon, a federal agency. Unlike the first
group, the relevant federal agency has far less control over these entities.
Most notably, there are, across forty-one states, over eighty-five of these
organizations tied to the Department of Veterans Affairs, called nonprofit
research and education corporations (NPCs). 88 The government retains
some control over NPCs.89
Venture capital vehicles, which the federal government funds or supports, compose the fifth of the seven categories of quasi-governmental
entities. Enterprise funds, which were established for Poland and Hungary
in 1989, are “designated by the President pursuant to law and governed by a
Board of Directors, which undertake loans, grants, equity investments,
feasibility studies, technical assistance, training, and other forms of assistance
to private enterprise activities in the Eastern European country . . . .”90 The
federal government pays for these funds, which were established as private
nonprofit corporations under Delaware law. 91 By contrast, the federal

85
86

KOSAR, QUASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 14-15.
Established by Congress in 1967, the National Park Foundation is “the only national charitable nonprofit whose sole mission is to directly support the National Park Service.” About Us,
NAT’L PARK FOUND., http://www.nationalparks.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). The
Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service, ex officio, and at least six
private individuals chosen by the Secretary sit on the Foundation’s board. 16 U.S.C. § 19f (2012).
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2012) (“The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the
United States Government, and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, shall be subject to, and
have all the powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by, the District of Columbia Nonprofit
Corporation Act.”).
88 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 17. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, by
statute, can “authorize the establishment at any Department medical center” of an NPC “to
provide a flexible funding mechanism for the conduct of approved research and education at the
medical center.” 38 U.S.C. § 7361(a) (2006).
89 The Secretary appoints the NPC’s board, which has to include the director of the medical
center; the NPC can be investigated by the Department’s Inspector General; and the NPC is
bound by federal laws, regulations, and executive orders that apply to nonprofits. KOSAR, QUASI
GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 17-18.
90 22 U.S.C. § 5401(c)(5) (2012).
91 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 19.
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government does not pay for investment funds; such funds rely on government guarantees.92 These venture capital vehicles involve billions of dollars.93
The sixth category of quasi-government agencies at the federal–private
boundary has far less financial and governmental import. Congressionally
chartered nonprofit organizations, known as Title 36 entities, are private
entities “with a patriotic, charitable, historical, or educational purpose.”94
Subtitle II of Title 36 currently lists ninety-four such entities, including the
Boy Scouts of America, Little League Baseball, and the National Academy
of Sciences.95 These entities often operate under federal and state charters.96
The federal designation, however, is typically honorific: they “do not receive
direct appropriations, they exercise no federal powers, their debts are not
covered by the full faith and credit of the United States, and they do not
enjoy original jurisdiction in the federal courts.”97
The U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), which received considerable
coverage recently in light of Lance Armstrong’s drug use in competitive
cycling,98 is similar to these entities. The agency began operations in 2000
following the decision of the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC), a Title 36
entity,99 to externalize its anti-doping program.100 According to its website,
the USADA is a “non-profit, non-governmental agency.”101 Although not
chartered under Title 36,102 Congress has recognized the USADA as “the

92 Specifically, OPIC guarantees loans made to “private, profit-seeking corporate investment
funds” that invest in particular developing countries. Id. at 20.
93 Id.
94 KOSAR, QUASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 22; see also KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL30340, CONGRESSIONALLY CHARTERED NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
(“TITLE 36 CORPORATIONS”): WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW C ONGRESS TREATS THEM
(2008) [hereinafter KOSAR, TITLE 36 CORPORATIONS].
95 36 U.S.C. subtit. II (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
96 KOSAR, Q UASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 23.
97 Id. Typically, the only federal mandate that these organizations face is an independent
annual audit, the results of which must be given to Congress. 36 U.S.C. § 10101 (2006); cf.
KOSAR, TITLE 36 CORPORATIONS, supra note 94, at 4 (noting that the Red Cross also “fulfill[s]
U.S. treaty obligations under the Geneva Conventions and aid[s] in disaster response”).
98 See, e.g., Juliet Macur, Why a Confession by Armstrong Could Benefit Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6. 2013, at SP4 (“During his battle with the United States Anti-Doping Agency last year,
Lance Armstrong went to extreme lengths to disparage the agency, a quasi-governmental
organization charged with policing banned drug use in Olympic sports.”).
99 36 U.S.C. ch. 2205 (2006).
100 History, UNITED STATES ANTI -DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/history (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014).
101 About USADA, UNITED STATES ANTI -DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/about
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
102 The House of Representatives, through a Judiciary Committee resolution, decided in
1994 to stop chartering nonprofits under Title 36. KOSAR, TITLE 36 C ORPORATIONS, supra note
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official anti-doping agency for Olympic, Pan American, and Paralympic
sport in the United States”103 and provides most of its funding. 104 The
USADA is also required to submit an annual report to Congress containing
a financial audit and a description of the agency’s activities.105
Some organizations do not fit into the previous six categories of quasigovernmental entities, even though they operate at the federal–private
border. The CRS has a catchall category for them: instrumentalities of
indeterminate character. 106 In short, the range of governmental–
nongovernmental entities is vast. Government corporations, like the USPS,
are just one example of entities at this boundary.
C. Across Levels of Government
The previous Section describes organizations at the border of the federal
government and the private sector. This Section turns to intergovernmental
organizations. Agencies exist at the border of the federal government and
the states, at the border of the federal government and foreign countries,
and at the border of the federal government and Native American tribes. To
be certain, considerable attention in administrative law commentary has
been paid to each “pair” of governments, generally focused on members of
each pair as separate actors.
1. Federal–State Border
The most significant organizational border, in terms of policy, in this
intergovernment category is the one between the federal government and
the states. The oldest organization may be the state-level National Guard.107
Each state (and D.C. and Puerto Rico) has a National Guard, which is
94, at 2, 13. Some organizations have since been chartered without going through the Judiciary
Committee. Id.
103 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-67,
§ 644, 115 Stat. 514, 555 (2001).
104 21 U.S.C. § 2003 (2012).
105 Id. § 2002.
106 Three examples are the American Institute in Taiwan, the National Endowment for
Democracy, and the U.S. Investigation Services. KOSAR, QUASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62,
at 25-31.
107 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16 (reserving the right to the states to train militias
and appoint their officers); 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (permitting the President to call into service a
state militia to suppress an insurrection within that state); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7 (1973)
(noting the National Guard may be federalized). The Army National Guard and the Air National
Guard together compose the National Guard. There is also a National Guard of the United States,
which is a completely federal entity. John G. Kester, State Governors and the Federal National Guard,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 182 (1988).
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“commanded by [state] governors, except on the rare occasions when it is
called into federal service.”108 Not only does the federal government recognize, regulate, and fund the state National Guard, the President can also
press its members into service.109 Thus, the National Guard has both state
and federal missions.
Different organizations at this boundary perform classic governmental
functions, such as the distribution of government benefits to citizens. For
instance, the Social Security Administration (SSA), the largest dispenser of
federal benefits,110 manages federal and state employees.111 There are also
agencies that have federal and state representatives working together to
perform particular tasks, typically in response to some regional issue. For
example, the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA)
operates Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and Washington
Dulles International Airport. 112 The federal government leased these
airports to the MWAA two years after it created a compact between the
state of Virginia and the District of Columbia. 113 Currently, seventeen
members compose the Authority’s board of directors: the Governor of
Virginia appoints seven; the Mayor of D.C. selects four; the Governor of
Maryland picks three; and the President chooses three.114 There are other
hybrid federal–state agencies, such as the Delaware River Basin Commission
(DRBC),115 formed by similar compacts.116
108
109

Kester, supra note 107, at 183.
See 32 U.S.C. § 108 (2006) (permitting the President to withhold aid from a state’s National
Guard); Kester, supra note 107, at 183 (noting that members of a state National Guard may be
federalized on rare occasions).
110 See MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION IN A MERICAN GOVERNMENT 5 (1990) (describing the SSA as a “federal program
for supporting the income of needy blind, aged, and disabled persons”).
111 SSA disability claims are typically filed in an SSA field office, staffed by federal employees.
However, state offices—called Disability Determination Services (DDS), staffed by state
employees, and funded by the federal government—determine whether a claimant is disabled.
Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Dale D. Glendening, What We Should Do About Social Security Disability,
REGULATION, Spring 2012, at 16, 16.
112 It leases both airports from the Department of Transportation (DOT). Metro. Wash.
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 261 (1991).
113 49 U.S.C. § 49106(a) (2006); 32 D.C. Reg. 7393 (Dec. 20, 1985); 1985 Va. Acts 1095; see
also Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (recounting the
history of the MWAA).
114 Lori Aratani, D.C. Council to Vote on MWAA Bill That Increases Board Member Count,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2012, at B1.
115 The DRBC was founded in 1961 to manage the water resources of the Delaware River
Basin with participation from the states of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, as
well as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75
Stat. 688 (1961). The DRBC recently proposed wide-ranging regulations on gas development,
including hydraulic fracturing. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 19, at 21-23.

2014]

Bureaucracy at the Boundary

863

Finally, there are federal agencies with state representatives in meaningful
roles. For example, as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on
Poverty, Congress created the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC).117
The President chooses one member, and the Governors of the thirteen
Appalachian states each select another member.118 Any decision that the
ARC makes must be supported by the federal member and a majority of the
state members. 119 Another federal agency, the Endangered Species Act
Exemption Committee, has members “from each affected state, who
together get one vote to represent all their interests.”120 A more recent
example is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), created by
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.121 The
Council is charged with identifying and addressing risks to financial stability. 122 Its voting members are the heads of executive and independent
financial regulatory agencies, but three of the five nonvoting members are
state officials.123
2. Federal–Foreign Border
States are not the only government entities interconnected with the federal government in various agency structures. Foreign countries and Native
116 Interstate compacts have to be approved by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
States cannot withdraw unilaterally from a compact. Hasday, supra note 21, at 3. Federal participation in these compacts varies. See id. at 15 n.63 (listing examples).
117 MOE, supra note 19, at 59; see also Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-136, 79 Stat. 552 (providing for public works and economic development programs
in depressed regions); Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-4, 79 Stat.
5 (establishing such a program in the Appalachian region).
118 40 U.S.C. § 14301(b)(1)-(2) (2006). The ARC is run by two co-chairmen: the federal
member and one elected from the state representatives. Id. § 14301(b)(3). Using federal money,
the Commission largely funds projects aimed at helping the Appalachian region economically. Id.
§ 14303.
119 Id. § 14302(a).
120 Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 65
ADMIN L. REV. 689, 699 (2013).
121 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
122 See 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
123 The state officials include a state insurance commissioner, a state banking supervisor, and
a state securities commissioner, all designated according to state selection processes. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5321(b)(2); see also Gersen, supra note 120, at 698 (noting that “it is unclear precisely what the
impact on voting member behavior will be”). In some sense, the FSOC also exists on the
executive–legislative border. Voting members on the FSOC include leaders of executive agencies,
such as the Secretary of the Treasury, and leaders of independent regulatory commissions, such as
the chairperson of the CFTC. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1)(g). It also includes leaders of government
corporations, such as the chairperson of the FDIC. Id. § 5321(b)(1)(f ).
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American tribes also interact with the federal bureaucracy in interesting
ways. The U.S. Government Manual has a separate category for primary
international organizations of which the federal government is a part.124
These thirteen organizations are typically made up of member countries,
often with some subset wielding more authority than the balance of the
membership. For example, the IBRD, part of the World Bank group, has 188
country members.125 A board of executive directors manages the Bank for all
the members. 126 Five countries—France, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States—each select an executive director; in
particular, the President selects, with Senate confirmation, the U.S. Executive Director for a set term.127 These directors officially select the President
of the Bank, but in practice, the President of the United States has always
chosen the President of the Bank with European acquiescence.128 Each of
the international organizations listed in the Manual involves a number of
countries. There are also bilateral organizations in which the United States
works with either Mexico or Canada on topics of mutual interest.129
The connections of these boundary organizations to the federal government vary. The U.S. members of these entities are usually presidential
appointees and typically receive directions from classic executive agencies.130 Yet the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) views some members as
124 The Manual also keeps another list of dozens of “other international organizations in
which the United States participates.” GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 27, at 523-25. A good
number are subsidiaries of primary organizations, such as the World Health Organization, which is
a part of the United Nations. Id. Classifying these entities as federal boundary institutions may
conflict with the standard view that international organizations exist separately from the countries
that contribute personnel and funding. Andrew Stumer, Liability of Member States for Acts of
International Organizations: Reconsidering the Policy Objections, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 553, 555 (2007).
Notwithstanding the conventional perspective, because the United States contributes in fundamental
ways to these organizations, I think of them as boundary organizations between the federal
government and the other foreign countries that participate. See also KOPPELL, supra note 19, at 7
(noting, without examining in detail, that international organizations are an “additional emerging
class of hybrid”).
125 Leadership, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014).
126 Id.
127 Applicability of the Fed. Vacancies Reform Act to Vacancies at the Int’l Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, 24 Op. O.L.C. 58, 58-59 (2000).
128 Howard Schneider & Zachary Goldfarb, World Bank Pick Is Surprise, WASH. POST, Mar.
24, 2012, at A1.
129 For example, the federal government participates in the International Boundary and
Water Commission and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission with Mexico, and the
International Joint Commission and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense with Canada.
GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 27, at 527-28.
130 The U.S. Director of the World Bank and the IMF “receive their instructions through the
Secretary of the Treasury.” Applicability of the Fed. Vacancies Reform Act, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 62.
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sitting within these classic agencies, such as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in the State Department, but not others,
such as the U.S. Executive Directors of the IBRD and the International
Monetary Fund.131
3. Federal–Tribal Border
Although the U.S. Government Manual does not place organizations
linking the federal government and Native American tribes in a separate
category, several such entities exist. For instance, the National Indian
Gaming Commission (NIGC), which was established in 1988 within the
Department of the Interior, regulates gaming on tribal lands.132 The NIGC’s
Chairman is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and
the Secretary of the Interior selects the other two commissioners for threeyear terms.133 Like many independent regulatory commissions described
below, party balancing requirements prevent more than two of the three
commissioners from belonging to the same political party. Unlike other
commissions, however, at least two of the three leaders of the NIGC must
be enrolled members of a federally recognized tribe.134
In short, there are a range of entities at the boundary of the federal government and other governments or sovereigns. These intergovernmental
bodies perform tasks common to classic administrative agencies as well as
less typical duties.
D. Within the Federal Government
The final category of boundary organizations includes those located
within the federal government but not entirely within one branch. Of all
the boundary organizations described in this Article, these are likely the
most familiar.

131
132

Id. at 59, 61.
25 U.S.C. § 2706 (2006); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.
2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (2012) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(2012)).
133 25 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(1).
134 Id. § 2704(b)(3); see also 16 U.S.C. § 470i(a) (2006) (mandating that one of the twentythree members making up the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation be a “member of an
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization who represents the interests of the tribe or
organization of which he or she is a member”).
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1. Legislative–Executive Border
Starting with Article I, the legislature’s boundaries house several powerful
organizations, particularly at the legislative–executive border.135 The GAO is
one such key player. Created in 1921 as “an instrumentality of the United
States Government independent of the executive departments,” 136 and
strengthened after Watergate, the GAO monitors agency action “on its own
initiative, by legislative mandate, and at the request of congressional
committees and individual members of Congress.”137 At the GAO’s helm is
the Comptroller General. The President selects the Comptroller General
from a list of at least three names provided by a congressional commission
led by, among others, the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate; the Senate then must confirm the nominee for the
person to take control.138 By contrast, the President does not select the
leaders of many other congressional support agencies.139 The Comptroller
135 Although not a separate agency, Inspectors General (IGs), who are Senate-confirmed
presidential appointees supposedly selected for expertise and without regard to partisanship, also
function at the boundary between these two branches. See PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING
GOVERNMENT 3 (1993). Most notably, IGs “are among the few presidential officers in government who report to both Congress and the president.” Id. In addition to semiannual reports, IGs
must report to Congress within seven days of notifying the agency of “serious problems.” Shirin
Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1027, 1034 (2013). IGs typically operate independently of agency leaders, though some
agency heads can block investigations if national security is threatened. Id. at 1035. In some sense,
IGs move classic executive agencies slightly closer to the legislative–executive border.
136 31 U.S.C. § 702(a) (2006).
137 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Auditing Politics or Political Auditing? 1 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law
Research Paper No. 964656), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=964656. The GAO can make
recommendations to the agencies it is evaluating and to Congress. When working at the request of
individual members, it engages in what Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz term “firealarm” oversight, examining projects that have been called to its attention. Mathew D. McCubbins
& Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 165 (1984). When performing periodic and legally mandated studies, the GAO
functions more as a “police-patrol” of the bureaucracy. Id.
138 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2). The appointments provision for the GAO’s head (but not the removal
provision) thus roughly parallels Executive Branch entities, though the President is generally not
restricted to picking officials from a list. Cf. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1014, 118 Stat. 3638, 3663 (2004) (instructing the Director of National
Intelligence to recommend candidates for vacant intelligence agency positions to the President for
nomination).
139 The Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), for example, is appointed by
the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, after receiving recommendations from the House and Senate Budget Committees, and the Librarian of Congress selects the
Director of the CRS. James A. Thurber, The Evolving Role and Effectiveness of the Congressional
Research Agencies, in THE HOUSE AT WORK 292, 313 tbl.11.12 ( Joseph Cooper & G. Calvin
Mackenzie eds., 1981). Additionally, prior to 1995, a special congressional board appointed the
Director of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). Id.
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General serves for fifteen years and may not be appointed to a second term;
he or she may be removed only for impairment or ineptitude, by a joint
resolution of Congress.140
Additionally, at the edge of the Executive Branch’s purview sit the much
discussed independent regulatory commissions and boards such as the FTC
and National Labor Relations Board. Some commentators place them at the
border with the Legislative Branch.141 Others situate them at the outer edge
of the Executive Branch without merging them into another branch of the
federal government.142 The most noticed features of these commissions and
boards generally include a multi-member leadership structure, removal of
those members only for good cause, and protection from certain obligations
under executive orders, including centralized regulatory review.143 These
features contrast with those of a typical executive agency, which is run by a
single administrator, who can be removed for any reason, and is subject to
more obligations from the White House.144 In other words, independent
regulatory commissions and boards are structurally designed to have more
independence from the President than executive agencies. In one view, this
independence from the President gives Congress more control because such
agencies have less protection from the White House.145 In another view, this
140 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (2006). To date, no Comptroller General has ever been removed. To
be certain, Congress has repeatedly declared that the GAO is “a part of the legislative branch.”
The Reorganization Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 70-263, § 7, 59 Stat. 613, 616; Reorganization Act of
1949, Pub. L. No. 81-109, § 7, 63 Stat. 203, 205. In addition, journalists usually refer to it as the
“nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress.” Eric Lipton, Investigators Criticize Response to
Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A18. But, as noted above, unlike many other congressional
agencies, the President chooses its leader. Moreover, the GAO views itself as an independent
watchdog agency. There are other organizations at the legislative–executive border, such as the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, as it is now constituted. 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(a)-(b) (2006).
141 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 926 (2008) (charting the locations of various
agencies between the White House and Congress); see also David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative
Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 400 (2004) (finding from empirical study
that “insulated” agencies, mainly IRCs, are “more responsive to congressional direction than other
agencies”).
142 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Y OO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 16 (2008) (arguing that
Presidents have never believed they were ceding control to Congress in the creation of IRCs); see
also Scott R. Furlong, Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39, 57-59 (1998) (finding from a survey of agency officials that IRCs
are less influenced than executive agencies by the President and Congress).
143 See Barkow, supra note 23, at 26-41 (summarizing the classic attributes of IRCs).
144 Id.
145 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (Scalia, J.) (“The
independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been
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independence does not necessarily shift these agencies toward Congress but
rather promotes autonomy from any overseer.146
2. Executive–Judicial Border
Organizations also exist at the boundary between the Executive and Judicial
Branches.147 Specifically, the United States Sentencing Commission, which
was established in 1984 as “an independent commission in the judicial
branch of the United States,”148 performs tasks similar in function to other

observed that their freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced
by increased subservience to congressional direction.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 592 (1984) (“[A]s
a former FTC Chairman . . . remarked, the independent agencies ‘have no lifeline to the White
House. [They] are naked before Congress, without protection there,’ because of the President’s
choice not to risk the political cost that assertion of his interest would entail.” (second alteration in
original)).
146 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control
over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1826 (2010) (“In other words, though complete
insulation from political control may be unattainable (and probably also undesirable because it
would eliminate accountability), the structure of an independent agency at least enables tensions
between political actors to keep politically motivated decisionmaking at bay.”). Somewhere
between the classic independent regulatory commission, at the border, and the classic executive
agency, at the center, are organizations with characteristics of both. The FSOC and the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection—both created by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act—are two such examples. The FSOC’s voting members are the heads of
executive and independent financial regulatory agencies. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b) (2012). The Bureau is
run by a director who serves a five-year term and can be removed only for cause. Id. § 5491. The
Independent Payment Advisory Board, created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
is another example. Its fifteen voting members are Senate-confirmed presidential appointees to
staggered six-year terms; they can be removed only for cause. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g) (Supp. V
2012). The nonvoting members are appointees from classic executive agencies: the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, and the Administrator of the Health Resources and Services Administration. Id.
147 There are also critical positions at the border between the White House and the courts,
notably, administrative law judges (ALJs). Like IGs, many agencies have ALJs. See Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180-81 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“My research reflects that the Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY P OLICY 514 (7th ed. 2011) (noting that approximately thirty agencies have ALJs).
About 1400 ALJs work for the Social Security Administration. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should
We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals?, REGULATION, Fall 2011, at 34, 34. Unlike IGs,
ALJs in agencies do not report to both branches. ALJs do perform judicial functions though,
particularly in formal proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)
(2012) (enumerating a number of duties given to ALJs). Agency adjudicators issue ten times as
many decisions in adversarial proceedings as do Article III judges in a given year. Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 936 (2009).
148 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006 & Supp. V. 2012).
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executive agencies.149 The Commission issues guidelines for sentencing in
the federal criminal system and assesses the efficacy of those guidelines in
decreasing criminal sentencing variation.150 It has an unusual leadership
structure. There are seven voting members, selected by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to six-year terms, who are removable only for
cause.151 At least three have to be federal judges and no more than four can
be members of the same political party.152
3. Legislative–Judicial Border
The border between the Legislative and Judicial Branches is far less
populated with boundary organizations. Nonetheless, there are notable
legislative–judicial entities. One prominent example is the GAO, which, in
addition to sitting at the border of the Legislative and Executive Branches,
also has judicial functions. 153 The GAO presently adjudicates bidding
disputes over the award of any procurement contract by a federal agency,
whether military or civilian.154 If the GAO decides that the issuing agency
did not comply with federal procurement law and regulations, it will
recommend that the agency take appropriate action.155 The GAO cannot
force the agency to comply with its decision; the agency only has to tell the
GAO whether it will comply. Thus, the GAO must rely on Congress to take
action.156 Nevertheless, bidders and agencies take the bid protest process
seriously for several reasons: any protest filed with the GAO requires an

149 See William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26
J.L. & POL. 305, 316-27 (2011) (showing how the Commission has ties to all three branches).
150 28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
151 Id. § 991(a).
152 Id.
153 See Kevin T. Abikoff, Note, The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of Bowsher v. Synar,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1539, 1560 (1987) (noting the GAO’s ability to ensure the Executive Branch is
complying with the law and to decide the respective rights of specific parties in a bid protest case).
154 See MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 1 (describing the GAO’s adjudicative power
in bid disputes). The GAO’s authority has expanded over time. This bid protest work is significant, both in number and scope. In a recent fiscal year, over 2300 cases were filed. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-199SP, BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2011). The number has been increasing in recent years. Id. Some of these
disputes involve big-ticket items. In 2008, for instance, the GAO sustained a protest filed by
Boeing challenging the award of a $35 billion contract for the KC-X aerial tanker to a team led by
Northrop Grumman. How the US GAO’s Bid Protest Process Works and Why Defense Contractors Abuse It,
DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gao-protestsdefense-programs-06269.
155 4 C.F.R. § 21.8 (2013).
156 Id.
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automatic stay of the contract’s implementation; a sizeable number of claims
are formally sustained or receive corrective action before a decision; and the
cost to filing a protest with the GAO is less than litigating in the Court of
Federal Claims.157 In addition, courts almost always defer to agency action
that relies on a GAO decision.158
In sum, although commentators have remarked that administrative
agencies often combine functions of all three branches of government and
do not fit easily into the Executive Branch, they have generally ignored the
boundary organizations previously mentioned, apart from independent
regulatory commissions. This lack of an easy fit for governmental entities on
a boundary with a particular branch, therefore, is even more prevalent than
commentators typically thought.
Table 1 summarizes the three major types of boundary organizations and
provides some key examples.
Table 1: Boundary Organizations
Boundary
Federal–Private
Purely Governmental–Private
Government Corporations
Quasi-Governmental–Private
Quasi-Official
Government Sponsored Enterprises
Federally Funded Research & Development
Centers
Agency Related Nonprofits
Venture Capital Vehicles
Congressionally Chartered Nonprofits
Other Instrumentalities
Federal–Other Government
Federal–State

Example

Amtrak
Smithsonian
Fannie Mae
Lincoln Laboratory
Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board
Overseas Private Investment
Corporation
Red Cross
National Endowment for
Democracy
National Guard

157 Recent Case, Federal Circuit Holds That Agency Was Arbitrary and Capricious in Following a
Government Accountability Office Recommendation: Turner Construction Co. v. United States, 645
F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1266 (2012); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 154 (showing that in Fiscal Years 2007 to 2011, the lowest annual rate
of claims upheld was 16% and the highest was 27% in cases that received a decision on the merits).
158 But see Recent Case, supra note 157, at 1270-72 (noting reasons why Turner might actually
decrease deference to the GAO).
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International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
National Indian Gaming
Commission

Federal–Foreign

Federal–Tribe
Within Federal Government
Legislative–Executive

Government Accountability
Office, Independent Regulatory Commissions
U.S. Sentencing Commission
Government Accountability
Office

Executive–Judicial
Legislative–Judicial

E. Movement
The previous three Sections describe federal boundary entities statically.
This Section looks at these organizations dynamically. Specifically, it describes
movement to the boundary as well as movement to the center. As with the
previous Sections, this effort is only descriptive, and later parts of this
Article consider related explanatory, normative, and legal questions. All
agencies are created, some die, and some change form. Some of these
changes in structure can shift an agency within a particular category.
Because this Article centers on boundary organizations, I describe shifts
only from the center to the boundary, or to the center from the boundary.
1. Movement from Center to Boundary
There are centrifugal examples—agencies that started more centrally
within the Executive Branch and formally moved to a boundary with the
private sector, another governmental entity, or a different federal branch.
On the private sector boundary, some classic executive agencies have been
restructured to look more like private entities. The most notable such move
involves the USPS, which Congress converted into a government corporation in 1971.159
159 As described in the Introduction, the USPS is the second oldest agency of the federal
government. Its leaders started as purely “executive officers.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
106 (1926); see also RICHARD R. J OHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: T HE AMERICAN POSTAL
SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE 134 (1995) (describing the role of early leaders of the Post
Office). The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 transformed the longstanding executive agency into
an “independent establishment” run by a Board of Governors (akin to a board of directors). Postal
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, §§ 201–202, 84 Stat. 719, 720-21 (1970) (codified as
amended at 39 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
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Congress has also shifted federal entities toward other governments.
These moves generally involve sections of federal agencies being moved into
newly created mixed-governmental structures. For instance, the Department
of Transportation (DOT), through the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), used to own and operate Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport. 160 Those airports
were then transferred to the MWAA, which also took over their operation.161 Thus, in some sense, part of the FAA moved to the border between
the federal government and certain state governments. Similarly, nineteen
federal agencies gave up their authority over the Delaware River Basin
when the DRBC was created.162
Finally, movement toward boundaries within the federal government
generally transforms an executive agency into an independent regulatory
commission or a similar entity. One of the oldest independent regulatory
commissions, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), arguably
started off as an executive agency because it was under the control of the
Secretary of the Interior for two years before Congress made the ICC
“functionally independent of the executive branch.” 163 In the 1990s, the
FAA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the SSA also became more
independent. Prior to the late 1990s, each agency largely functioned as a
classic executive agency, with a Senate-confirmed administrator who served
at the pleasure of the President. At various points in the 1990s, Congress
passed legislation to make the top position in each agency a term appointment.164 Additionally, though the head of the IRS arguably may still be
removed at will by the President, the other agencies’ administrators now
may be removed only for cause.165 One could also consider the center of the
private sector and think about moves to the public–private boundary. For
example, the government’s loan to the American International Group (AIG)

160 About the Authority: History, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON A IRPORTS AUTHORITY ,
http://www.metwashairports.com/263.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
161 Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, §§ 6003, 6005, 100
Stat. 1783-373, 1783-374 to 378.
162 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
163 Breger & Edles, supra note 31, at 1128-29.
164 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, § 7802(b)(2)(B), 112 Stat. 685, 691 (establishing a five-year term of office for the IRS
head); Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No 103-305, § 201, 108
Stat. 1569, 1581 (establishing a five-year term of office for the FAA administrator); Social Security
Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 702(a)(3), 108 Stat.
1464, 1466 (establishing a six-year term of office for the commissioner of Social Security).
165 See sources cited supra note 164.

2014]

Bureaucracy at the Boundary

873

in September 2008 in exchange for a 79.9% interest in the company could be
seen as transforming a purely private entity into a boundary organization.166
2. Movement from Boundary to Center
There are centripetal examples as well—agencies that moved from a
quasi-governmental space, a boundary with another federal branch, or a
boundary with another sovereign toward the center of the Executive
Branch—though such moves seem rarer.
The federal government has “nationalized” entities at the public–private
border. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an executive
agency, recently received regulatory authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.167 This move “place[d] Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac back in direct
federal control.”168
Federal agencies have also taken over tasks once managed by a mix of
federal and state authorities. At the founding of the United States, the
states (and localities) controlled education policy, with increased federal
funding over time. The organizational structure “evolved from a ‘layer cake’
into a ‘marble cake,’” with state and federal entities wielding overlapping
authority.169 The federal government then consolidated certain functions
when it created the Department of Education in 1980.170
Within the federal government, shifts toward the center generally happen when agencies are demolished or combined. For instance, by the time
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), an independent regulatory commission,
ceased to exist in 1984, some of its duties had been transferred to the FAA,
which at that time was a classic executive agency.171 Additionally, Congress
merged the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the
independent Federal Housing Finance Board to create the FHFA, an

166 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 494-96 (2009).
167 12 U.S.C. § 4511(b)(2) (2012).
168 Bressman & Thompson, supra note 23, at 608 n.34; see also Davidoff & Zaring, supra note
166, at 488-89 (explaining that the Treasury Department was given the power to purchase 79.9% of
the entities’ outstanding common shares).
169 LARY C. RAMPP ET AL., A N A DMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF E DUCATION, MAY 1980, at 16 (1998).
170 Id. at 20, 43.
171 Edmund Preston, The Federal Aviation Administration and Its Predecessor Agencies, U.S.
CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT COMMISSION, http://www.aahs-online.org/centennialofflight.net/
essay/Government_Role/FAA_History/POL8.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). The CAB had
earlier gained duties from the Civil Aeronautics Authority, a stand-alone executive agency, which
even earlier had taken responsibilities from the Department of Commerce. Id.
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executive agency, in 2008.172 More recently, President Obama asked Congress for power to consolidate six agencies’ assigned business and trade
duties into an executive agency: the relevant components of the Commerce
Department and all of the Small Business Administration, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, the Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and the U.S.
Trade and Development Agency.173
In sum, bureaucratic organizations do not always stay at the border, or in
the center. Thus, it is important to think about border entities statically as
well as dynamically. The next Part considers positive and normative theories
for their creation and movement.
II. THEORIES OF BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS
As the last Part demonstrates, boundary organizations make up substantial swaths of the federal administrative state. They sit in a multitude of
forms at different borders. Their prevalence raises critical positive and
normative questions about their creation and movement.
This Part attempts to provide some answers. The first Section advances
a theory for why politically savvy federal actors—Congress and the White
House—establish such boundary entities as opposed to more centrally
located agencies. This theory is explanatory and predictive. Under the
theory advanced here, boundary entities are the ordinary outcome of the
agency creation process. The second Section turns briefly to questions of
whether such boundary entities are desirable as a matter of social welfare or
democratic legitimacy. The third Section tentatively considers both the
positive and normative questions in a more dynamic setting. Although this
Part mainly focuses on the political choice between entities on the public–
private border and wholly public entities, my analysis generally applies to
the choice between the center and entities on any of the borders previously
described.174
172
173

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
Sean Reilly, Administration to Push Bill for Fast-Track Reorganization Authority, FED. TIMES
( Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120131/AGENCY04/201310303. This proposal
would move two government corporations into a larger Cabinet department. Id.
174 Because I focus on the President and Congress, the more difficult applications of the
theory advanced herein involve the federal–state and federal–foreign boundaries. In those
contexts, there are other players whose agreement is necessary for any such boundary organization.
The theory can still apply to these contexts, if one thinks of the preferences of these other actors
as shaping what negotiation is possible between the President and Congress. This approach—
looking at the choice between the center (either purely federal or purely executive) and a
particular boundary (private, other sovereign, or nonexecutive federal branch of government)—
does not, however, allow a strategic choice among the boundaries, for instance between federal–
state or public–private.
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This Part interacts in critical ways with the next Part of this Article,
which examines whether the law allows for certain boundary entities. The
law shapes what organizations can be created as a positive matter. Although
developed further below, I note some of these constraints here. A boundary
organization cannot upset the separation of powers. Federal leaders of such
an organization, if they exercise significant authority, must be selected by
the procedures detailed in the Appointments Clause. Sufficiently governmental entities must comply with constitutional obligations under the Bill
of Rights and statutory requirements under the APA. Some issues are not
clear—for example, can Congress delegate significant federal authority to a
state or private official who is not selected under the Appointments Clause?
Therefore, the courts sometimes serve as ex post agency designers, modifying
agency structure to comply with constitutional and statutory mandates.175 In
addition, the law influences the desirability of particular agency forms. The
positive and normative theories, in turn, affect what the law of boundary
entities and classic agencies should be.
A. Why Boundary Organizations Are Created
I approach the issue of agency design as a political scientist: what types
of agencies would rational political actors want to create?176 Because agencies, including boundary organizations, are created by political actors,177 this
is a relevant question. The rough intuition for why rational political actors
would create boundary organizations comes from the standard microeconomics problem where actors have to choose how to allocate resources over
multiple goods to maximize utility. Think of a standard two-good consumer
choice problem, where each side of the boundary represents a good. In such
problems, choosing to invest only in one good is a “corner solution.”
Boundary entities therefore would be “interior solutions” where actors
invest in goods on both sides of the boundary. Because corner solutions are

175 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154-55
(2010) (severing one layer of for-cause removal from the structure of the PCAOB).
176 This approach to agency design is a popular one. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Designing
Agencies (collecting citations), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW 333 (Daniel E. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). It is, however, not the only
possible approach. Cf. Kirk Emerson et al., An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance,
22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 5 (2011) (using a more systems-based or publicadministration approach).
177 See, e.g., Lee Davison, Politics and Policy: The Creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 17
FDIC BANKING REV., no. 2, 2005, at 17, 19-20 (describing the effort by President George H.W.
Bush’s Administration to create one such boundary organization, the Resolution Trust Corporation).
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often less interesting or less common in such problems, it would not be
surprising to see many interior solutions.
But what is the maximization problem, as applied to the administrative
state? First, we need a few assumptions. I presume that the President and
Congress are deciding jointly on the agency’s form.178 I also treat Congress
and the President each as a single player. To be sure, Congress (and the
President to some degree) is a “they,” not an “it.”179 In addition, I assume
that these political actors are creating one agency for a particular problem.180
This means that the actors have already decided to delegate some measure
of authority.181 It also means that the actors cannot delegate to multiple
organizations.182
Assumptions aside, the maximization problem driving the creation of
boundary entities might be one of political control. Recent work in political
science on agency design, most notably by Terry Moe and David Lewis,
reveals that the President and Congress care significantly about political
control.183 Specifically, Presidents prefer agencies under their direct supervision, such as Cabinet departments.184 What members of Congress want
depends on how similar their interests are to the President’s preferences.

178 To the extent that interest groups, agencies, states, and foreign countries shape design
preferences, their influence is being manifested through the White House and the legislature in
the framework here. For example, because of how they are elected, members of Congress (directly)
and the President (through the electoral college) represent state interests. JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME C OURT 178-79 (1980). In addition, although
Presidents unilaterally create agencies, they tend not to establish boundary organizations. See
Howell & Lewis, supra note 26, at 1099 (finding that Presidents created no government corporations in a fifty-year period).
179 It is helpful to equate Congress in this Section with the median party member in Congress. This Section does touch on some of the intra-institution dynamics.
180 The task here combines both subject matter and function. Cf. Alejandro E. Camacho &
Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of
Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19, 32-33 (2014) (separating the two). The task
assumption makes it less likely that the players are choosing between boundaries (e.g., federal–
state versus federal–foreign).
181 Thus, I am taking the tasks as fixed and examining institutional design. Many scholars,
especially in political science, take this approach. LEWIS, supra note 23, at 17. By contrast, most
“administrative law theory treats the design and operation of agencies as fixed or exogenous, while
asking how legal powers should be allocated between agencies and other institutions.” Elizabeth
Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1077 (2011).
182 It is possible, of course, for two entities, one on each side of a particular boundary to
function like one organization at the boundary. O’Connell, supra note 42, at 1704. The choice this
Article examines is what form that one agency will take.
183 Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN?
267 ( John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989); LEWIS, supra note 23.
184 LEWIS, supra note 23, at 30-32.
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When preferences diverge, they prefer agencies more insulated from the
President, such as independent regulatory commissions.185 This assessment
of preferences occurs at the point of agency formation, with members of
Congress also assessing expected divergence in the future.186 If members of
Congress have trouble reaching consensus, the President is more likely to
get a less insulated agency.187 Administrative law scholars have taken up this
work, largely thinking of agency design as a choice between an executive
agency and an independent regulatory commission.188
Even assuming that these political actors care only about political control,
the prevalence of boundary organizations suggests that the choice is not a
binary one between executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions. The latter gives members of Congress more control, but the choice
appears zero-sum in nature. Boundary organizations may allow both the
President and Congress to commit credibly to having the same amount of
control.
Other research does not assume political control brings only benefits.
B. Dan Wood and John Bohte speculate that “responsive designs also have a
higher probability of political holdup and larger potential losses if the
holdup occurs.”189 Stéphane Lavertu posits that the President cares about
“the policy risks associated with political changes in either branch.”190 In
other words, the President may want to avoid being blamed for bad policies
in certain areas and therefore prefers more insulated agencies in those
contexts. The sharing of political control between two political actors can
also decrease this risk. 191 Matthew Stephenson suggests that political
principals may prefer trading off control for expertise.192 More anecdotally, it
185 Id. Lewis collapses independent regulatory commissions, government corporations, and
Judicial Branch agencies into one category. Id. at 45.
186 Id. at 30-32.
187 Id.
188 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 141, at 898-900 (distinguishing between agencies located
fully within the executive and others with more structured independence); Rodríguez, supra note
146, at 1822 (describing differences between executive and independent agencies).
189 B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative
Design, 66 J. POL. 176, 184 (2004).
190 Stéphane Lavertu, Issue-Specific Political Uncertainty and Policy Insulation in US Federal
Agencies, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 145, 151 (2012).
191 See Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of
Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 622 (2010) (contradicting
popular opinion that Presidents prefer to act unilaterally); see also Bressman & Thompson, supra
note 23, at 630 (suggesting that the President is aware of the benefits to cooperating with
Congress).
192 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 79
n.77 (2008) (suggesting that voters’ dislike of policy variance may lead them to prefer more biased
policy).
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seems that both the President and Congress care about the political repercussions of their agency-design choices. It is more than a dislike for uncertainty and blame if outcomes are poor. These days, it seems politically
unwise to propose expanding the size of the federal government. This is a
key assumption in the analysis that follows.
To capture some of these complexities in a more systematic fashion, I
propose the following informal model to explain the creation and movement
of boundary entities. The model predicts that boundary organizations will
often be the outcome of negotiation between the President and Congress.
The structure of organizations will naturally vary depending on matters
such as the party affiliation of the political branches, the presence of divided
government, and the task given to the entity. Ultimately though, the
President and Congress care about two dimensions in designing boundary
entities: political control and competence. Let me explain each in turn.
1. Political Control
Political control of the agency depends partly on form. For example, the
President has more control over Cabinet departments than independent
regulatory commissions, whose leaders typically have removal protections.
Congress has more control over the GAO than a GSE because Congress
funds the GAO’s budget and plays a substantial role in picking its leader.
Political scientists tend to emphasize the benefits of political control.193
Under this view, bureaucracies can help implement policies that generate
electoral support. Thus, in a benefit-only or benefit-dominant perspective,
Presidents want agencies under their control, and Congress wants agencies
under or closer to its control. Divided government exacerbates this tension.
What follows, then, is a zero-sum quality to agency creation between the
two branches. An agency more under the President’s control is necessarily
an agency less under Congress’s control. This perspective has been applied
to government corporations. 194 This zero-sum quality can make both
institutions worse off. Congress may provide fewer resources to an agency

193 See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 4; see also Bressman & Thompson, supra note 23, at 601
(arguing views contrary to scholarly assumptions). This is similar, but not identical, to the ally
principle, “that a principal is willing to delegate more discretion to an agent with expected policy
preferences similar to the principal’s own.” Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1440 (2011).
194 See PAUL C. L IGHT, THE TIDES OF REFORM: MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK,
1945–1995, at 207 tbl.5.4 (1997) (classifying each shift of power to a public corporation as moving
either toward the President or toward Congress).
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more under the President’s control.195 If the branches could make credible
commitments about their ex ante behavior, such as an inability on the part of
the White House to replace agency leaders because of removal restrictions, the
President and Congress would both benefit196—but this may be impracticable.
Political control can have other costs as well. It can generate holdup
problems, making it harder for the agency to make needed decisions.197
Similarly, on the international level, unilateral country control may be less
efficient, 198 prevent needed coordination, 199 or generate a worse reputation200 than centralized action through boundary organizations. Unpopular
agency actions may also generate blame and electoral backlash for those
politicians too closely affiliated with the organizations. 201 For instance,
members of Congress often prefer their lack of control over the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission. That way, when the Commission effectively closes a military base, the legislators have distance from the
decision.202 More generally, adding to the classic administrative state can be
deeply unpopular for Democrats and Republicans alike, especially if it costs
money.203 Conversely, less political control may permit an agency to be

195 See generally Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 413 (2004)
(discussing potential legislative responses to greater executive control over agencies).
196 See id. at 415 (proposing a moderate presidential commitment to satisfy the legislature);
see also Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 433 (1989) (arguing that
“effective political control of an agency requires ex ante constraints on the agency (that is, a means
of restricting the agency’s decisionmaking before it actually makes policy choices)”).
197 Wood & Bohte, supra note 189, at 184.
198 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 12 (1998) (highlighting the World Bank as one such
organization).
199 See Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 2008, at 115, 143.
200 See Leslie Johns, Courts as Coordinators: Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 257, 259-60 (2012) (suggesting noncompliance in an
international system has negative reputational repercussions); Edward D. Mansfield & Jon C.
Pevehouse, Democratization and International Organizations, 60 INT’L ORG. 137, 144 (2006)
(discussing negative effects of transitional states’ failures to meet international obligations).
201 See Lavertu, supra note 190, at 170 (proposing that policymakers focus on certain special
interest constituencies that are more likely to pay attention to bureaucratic structure).
202 See Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National
Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 893-94 (2011) (describing the creation of the
Commission by Congress to lessen political pressures). An alternative perspective would be that
such institutional structures allow credible commitments. See Edward Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 631, 659, 662 (2012).
203 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 751 (2010) (noting
the political attraction of “concealing the size and scope of civilian and military programmatic
commitments”).
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“off-budget,”204 which generates its own electoral benefits. Politicians may
also want to effectively delegate control to interest groups, which may be
better able to capture entities.205 Alternatively, politicians may realize that
greater control undermines the agency expertise needed in a highly uncertain
and important policy area. 206 Finally, political control comes with legal
constraints on how money can be spent, how workers can be hired and fired,
and the level of review the courts can impose.207
In short, the President and Congress have to consider the costs and benefits of political control in deciding what form the agency should take. The
cost-benefit analysis may differ for each branch. This one dimension
generates several propositions:
Proposition 1: If the benefits to political control exceed the costs, the President prefers more control over the agency. If the costs to political control
dominate the benefits, the President prefers less control over the agency.
Proposition 2: As with the President, if the benefits to political control exceed
the costs, Congress prefers more control over the agency. If the costs to
political control dominate the benefits, Congress prefers less control over
the agency.
Proposition 3: Assuming the benefits to political control exceed the costs, in a
unified government, Congress is more willing to let the President have
more control over the agency. If the durability of the President’s party in
the White House, however, is shaky, Congress is less willing to let the President have more control over the agency.
Proposition 4: Assuming the benefits to political control exceed the costs, in
a divided government, the President and Congress must compromise on
control of the agency. If the costs to political control dominate the benefits,
204 Harold Seidman, The Quasi World of the Federal Government, 6 BROOKINGS REV., Summer
1988, at 23, 24. The movement of Fannie Mae from a more central agency to a government
corporation to a privately owned GSE “can be directly attributable to revisions in budget rules.”
KOPPELL, supra note 19, at 6.
205 See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., supra note 196, at 457 n.91 (describing capture theory).
206 See Lavertu, supra note 190, at 152 (suggesting the benefits of cooperation are greater in
uncertain environments); Stephenson, supra note 192, at 83 (rejecting the idea that control is best
in uncertain environments); cf. Stephenson, supra note 193, at 1444 (noting that increased
discretion in the delegated task may encourage more research investment by the agency).
207 See Michaels, supra note 202, at 835-42 (describing how private contractors have been used
in the national security context to avoid legal constraints and increase employment flexibility).
Interestingly, there might be some political benefits to less control. If the “Hatch Act and civil
service laws do not apply,” the President can use his appointment authority to these entities “to
reward political supporters,” and these officials can engage in political work. Seidman, supra note
204, at 27.
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however, the President and Congress both prefer less control. If one institution views the net benefits as positive and the other as negative, the former
institution faces no opposition in getting more control.

Considering only political control, the political branches often create
boundary organizations when the costs to such control dominate the
benefits. They may also form such entities during periods of divided
government. Boundary organizations can then be a second-best outcome for
each branch: unlike some agency structures that give one actor more power
than the other, some boundary organizations give little control to either
branch.208
Stability of institutional control also shapes the negotiation. To the extent
that we expect more stability in party control in Congress than in the White
House, the majority party in Congress may prefer boundary organizations
to executive agencies. In a unified government, if the majority party in
Congress expects more constant party control in the White House than in
Congress, it may prefer executive agencies.
This also plays out in vertical decisions. As George Krause and Ann
Bowman show, “delegat[ing] policymaking authority to subnational entities
is contingent upon the partisan composition of state governments.” 209
Specifically, “national level politicians respond directly to partisan political
preferences at the state level and either consolidate or delegate policymaking authority accordingly.”210 In addition, “the national government (principal), wishing to mitigate adverse selection problems, will prefer to devolve
such authority when its policy interests are more apt to be faithfully represented at the subnational level (agents).”211 These propositions about control
across institutions at any given time and predicted control in the future
partly explain the decision to delegate considerable authority to the states in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In part, Democrats
fearing future Republican Presidents delegated considerable authority to the
states, in the expectation of more faithfulness by Democratic states over
time in administering the ACA.212 Another part of the decision to delegate

208 As noted earlier, the analysis presumes each institution is a single actor. Think of each
institution as its median member. Extreme members, for example, prefer less centralization. See
Jacques Crémer & Thomas R. Palfrey, Political Confederation, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 70 (1999).
209 George A. Krause & Ann O’M. Bowman, Adverse Selection, Political Parties, and Policy
Delegation in the American Federal System, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359, 360-61 (2005).
210 Id. at 361.
211 Id.
212 Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1105 (2014) (noting
that Republican states have “refus[ed] to take part”).

882

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 841

to the states rested on the political costs of creating too much federal
bureaucracy.
Separate from concerns of stability of party dominance, partisanship
may also factor into preferences on political control.213 Republicans, given
their stated preferences for states’ rights, may see more benefits to giving
control to entities at the federal–state border than to organizations entirely
at the federal level.214 By contrast, Democrats, given their preferences for
international organizations, may see more benefits to allocating authority to
organizations at the federal–foreign border. 215 Nevertheless, partisanship
seems secondary compared to institutional priorities on the political control
dimension, unlike on the competence dimension, to which I now turn.
2. Competence
Political control—particularly its benefits—receives considerable attention in political science. But it does not sufficiently explain a wide variety of
agency forms on its own. Consider the federal courts and agency-related
nonprofit corporations such as PCAOB. The President and Congress have
some political control over both the courts and PCAOB through, respectively,
the appointment of judges and SEC members, who then choose PCAOB
members. Yet, both operate largely independently of the two elected
branches. Even more strikingly, the institutions are quite different: the
courts are classic public entities while the agency-related nonprofit corporations have state charters and freedom from many traditional government
restrictions. For instance, PCAOB members have higher salaries than the
President of the United States.216
Agency competence, as viewed by the political actors, tries to capture
some of these distinctions. Competence here reflects the perceived ability of
agencies to perform a set delegated task.217 Ability generally reflects some
notion of efficiency, but it could also reflect democratic legitimacy or some

213 See Jide Nzelibe, Partisan Conflicts over Presidential Authority, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
389, 397 (2011) (discussing different parties’ potential rankings of presidential authority).
214 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 212, at 1099 (noting the “standard federalism narrative”).
215 Id.
216 Compare Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 n.1
(2010) (reporting salaries of the PCAOB Chairman and other members), with BARBARA L.
SCHWEMLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 90-53, SALARIES OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS: A FACT
SHEET 2 (2005) (providing the President’s salary).
217 This perceived competence could be actual competence due to external factors (e.g., market
imperfections) or internal factors (e.g., institutional transaction costs or capacities).
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other characteristic besides political control.218 As perceived by the actor,
decisions of competence are social welfare decisions, and decisions as to
control are political decisions. Competence is not measured quantitatively,
such as whether entities are more or less competent. Rather, competence is
measured along a private–public metric (or for the other dimensions, along
the nonfederal/non–Executive Branch–federal/Executive Branch metric). The
most competent entity to conduct criminal trials is arguably purely public.
The most competent entity to build a courthouse is likely private.
The President and Congress have preferences along this private–public
metric (or boundary–center metric) as to the best performance of the
delegated task. In contrast to political control, where the focus is on the
branch’s interests, competence may reflect more partisan than institutional
preferences. Conservatives tend to lean toward the private sector,219 while
liberals are more likely to see the public sector as socially desirable.220
Because one can assume that the President and Congress want the agency
to perform the task well, this construction of competence does not easily
encompass Terry Moe’s theory that political actors seek certain agency
structures to prevent agencies from carrying out intended tasks. 221 For
instance, Moe suggests that conservatives in Congress favored an independent
regulatory commission structure for the Consumer Product Safety Commission because industry groups would find it easier to delay agency enforcement.222 This set of preferences could be viewed as recording preferences
for incompetence for some actors and competence for others. This complicates how the two actors negotiate competence, although I do not consider
this issue further.
In sum, the President and Congress must assess competence in performing
the delegated task to determine what structure the agency should take. The
assessment may differ for each political party and perhaps for each branch.

218 Conservatives, for example, may believe that private entities are more efficient or better
protect individual liberty than public ones. By contrast, liberals may believe that public entities are
more efficient (due to private market failures) or better represent the public interest than private
organizations.
219 See LEWIS, supra note 23, at 71; David Leonhardt, Romney’s First 100 Days, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2012, at SR1 (noting that under a Romney Administration, “the private sector would take
over some government functions”).
220 Cf. John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2011, at A1 (noting that the 2012 Republican presidential candidates viewed the Environmental
Protection Agency as “the very symbol of a heavy-handed regulatory agenda imposed by the
Obama administration”).
221 See Moe, supra note 183, at 277 (explaining how, in a democratic government, politicians
“favor structures” that are beneficial to them politically).
222 Id. at 295-96.
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This second dimension, in isolation, generates two propositions, as applied
to the private–public boundary:
Proposition 5: Republicans often believe more private organizations are better at performing the delegated task than more public ones.
Proposition 6: Democrats often believe more public organizations are better
at performing the delegated task than more private ones.223

Considering only competence, as measured on this private–public dimension, Republicans in control of the White House and Congress are more
likely than Democrats to create boundary entities. During periods of
divided government, the President and Congress may compromise on
boundary organizations.
3. Putting Political Control and Competence Together
Even with just two dimensions (political control and agency competence) and two designers (the President and Congress), decisions regarding
agency structure can become quite complicated. This subsection seeks to
explain when these designers will choose to create boundary organizations.
Figure 1 roughly illustrates the placement of a variety of entities, including
boundary organizations, along these dimensions. The political control
dimension, represented on the vertical axis, captures presidential control at
the top and congressional control at the bottom. Entities toward the center
face little congressional or presidential control, or can place both overseers
in conflict to gain independence.224 The competence dimension, represented
on the horizontal axis, moves from structures more peripheral to the federal
government or Executive Branch on the left to more central structures on
the right.

223 Democrats generally believe that the federal government is better at performing the
delegated task than state governments, while Republicans typically subscribe to the inverse. See
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 212, at 1099.
224 This framework creates some complexities, as entities firmly under congressional control
do not necessarily confront less presidential control than some entities closer to the origin, which
are removed from both presidential and congressional control.
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Figure 1: Positive Theory of Agency Creation

Some spaces in this two-dimensional model do not house organizations.
Most notably, the Constitution and other bodies of law like the APA
preclude some locations, and the following Section takes up legal constraints in more detail.
By contrast, other spaces hold many organizations. Mixed public–private
entities crowd along the horizontal axis, for example. The placements are
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relative. A line of public entities is at the right, in which Cabinet departments face the most presidential control. The courts and organizations at
the boundary of the Legislative and Executive Branches face little or
opposing amounts of presidential and congressional control. Congressional
support agencies, such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and
entities at the border of the Legislative and Judicial Branches face more
congressional control than presidential control. The preferences of the President and Congress are not marked; I consider them more systematically below.
In certain contexts, the agency designers face tradeoffs between their
preferences on political control and agency competence. Specifically, if the
benefits to political control exceed the costs, Republican Presidents and
Congresses confront a conflict between their desire for political control and
their desire for private organizations. Democratic Presidents and Congresses,
however, do not face such a conflict, as many assume they prefer public
entities. Conversely, if the costs to political control outweigh the benefits,
Democratic Presidents and Congresses face a choice between their desire to
avoid control and their desire for public organizations. Republican Presidents and Congresses do not confront a conflict in this circumstance, as
most people assume they prefer private entities. Those who are economically
inclined can think of the tradeoff as a two-good consumer utility model. If
the consumer is Republican, the vertical axis measures political control, and
the horizontal axis measures the extent of privatization (so the origin is set
at roughly no control and no privatization). The opposing party functions as
the budget constraint, allowing only so much control and privatization.
In addition to the connection between the two dimensions for a specific
actor, one must consider how the preferences of the President and Congress
interact in order to understand which organizational structures are chosen.
Consider five cases: (1) a divided government, in which benefits to political
control exceed costs for both actors; (2) a divided government, in which
costs to political control dominate benefits for both actors; (3) a divided
government, in which benefits to political control exceed costs only for
Democrats; (4) a unified government, in which benefits to political control
exceed costs for both actors; and (5) a unified government, in which costs to
political control dominate benefits for both actors. Relevant party variations
are considered in each case.
In the first case, both Republicans and Democrats see the benefits to
political control as exceeding the costs. Because of the divided government,
the actors here are at odds—a Republican President and Democratic
Congress (or a Democratic President and Republican Congress) will
disagree on political control and agency competence. The outcome depends
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on bargaining strength but likely rests in the middle area of both dimensions.225
In the second case, both Republicans and Democrats view the costs to
political control as exceeding the benefits. The actors are less at odds than in
the first case, but some conflict remains. A Republican President and
Democratic Congress (or the reverse) have more similar views on political
control but still clash on agency competence. The result is similar to the
first case, probably with the agency somewhere in the middle of both of the
two metrics. The difference is that the parties want to relinquish political
control (as opposed to engaging in a zero-sum game).
In the third case, Republicans see the costs of political control as exceeding
the benefits, but Democrats view the benefits of political control as exceeding the costs. Neither party, therefore, faces any tradeoff on its own preferences concerning political control and agency competence. In the case of a
Democratic President and Republican Congress, both favor presidential
control but must compromise on agency competence. Thus, the organizations in the upper two quadrants of the figure (as determined by the figure,
not the page) represent possible outcomes. With a Republican President
and Democratic Congress, both institutions favor congressional control and
must compromise on agency competence. The organizations in the lower
two quadrants of the figure are possible outcomes.
In the fourth case, as with the first, both Republicans and Democrats see
the benefits to political control as exceeding the costs. Unlike the first case,
however, the same party controls both the White House and Congress.
Under Democratic control, one can expect a classic executive agency
structure. Under Republican control, the desire for privatized structures
tempers the desire for political control, likely resulting in boundary entities
(perhaps with more presidential appointments).
In the fifth case, as with the second, both Republicans and Democrats
view the costs to political control as exceeding the benefits. Unlike the
second case, however, in the fifth case the same party controls both the
White House and Congress. Under Republican control, one anticipates an
agency structure with considerable connections to the private sector. Under
Democratic control, the preference for public structures and lack of control
may yield boundary organizations within the federal government.
In short, this analysis predicts that Congress and the White House will
often establish boundary entities to perform tasks. Boundary organizations
225 If the Republican player trades off between political control and agency competence in
the classic consumer utility diagram, the Democratic player acts as the budget constraint, pushing
in toward the origin.
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are therefore not marginal at all. These predictions could be tested by
looking at changes in agency structures—which would keep agency functions relatively constant, in line with the model’s assumption of a set task.
B. The Consequences of Boundary Organizations
The previous Section illustrated why politicians may want to establish
boundary organizations. This Section briefly evaluates whether these
entities are desirable in terms of social welfare and democratic legitimacy.
Commentators often presume, explicitly or implicitly, some tradeoff
between these two goals. 226 Just as boundary organizations balance the
competence and responsiveness concerns of political actors, they also
balance these normative objectives. Assuming these objectives are worthwhile
and achievable, that balance will be optimal in a number of contexts, and
suboptimal in others.
1. Social Welfare
A social welfare planner cares about the public’s economic interest.
Compared to other entities, boundary organizations, particularly those at
the public–private border, may promote that interest for a variety of
reasons. First, such entities may be more flexible—both in terms of policy
mechanisms and objectives—because of market pressure or other factors.227
One reason may be the relative freedom that boundary entities enjoy from
restrictions that other federal agencies face.228 Alternatively, or in combination, flexibility may result from market or other pressures to innovate.
Second, border agencies may be more insulated from the special interests of
public or private actors (on either side of the boundary),229 which often
226 See, e.g., KOSAR, QUASI GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 4 (noting the belief that the
“unusual structures [of quasi-governmental organizations] would be constructed to promote
‘flexibility,’ even when flexibility sometimes resulted in less accountability”).
227 Cf. Freeman, supra note 24, at 631 n.368 (noting that privatization could result in “cost
savings without a concomitant decline in quality”).
228 See Michaels, supra note 202, at 838-40 (describing private organizations’ greater flexibility in contracting and employment compared to government agencies); Lex Rieffel & James W.
Fox, The Millennium Challenge Corporation: An Opportunity for the Next President 6 (Brookings Inst.,
Global Economy & Development Working Paper No. 30, 2008) (noting a special-purpose
government corporation’s freedom from requirements, including the obligation to commit
government funds in the year they are appropriated).
229 See Barkow, supra note 23, at 20-21 (noting that insulation can promote public interest
regulation). Relatedly, insulation from all political actors can foster stability, which can be
beneficial—even if that insulation results in biased outcomes. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal
Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2008) (proposing that “the greater
the bureaucracy’s expected policy bias, the lower the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation”).
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diverge from the public’s interest. Thus, they may be able to function outside
of arrangements that are dysfunctional. Third, if there are externalities or
informational asymmetries in the market, boundary organizations may
produce more efficient outcomes than purely private actors. 230 Finally,
boundary organizations may have more expertise. 231 This expertise may
derive from higher employee salaries, especially for entities unconstrained
by federal hiring rules.232
The social welfare story of boundary organizations is easy to tell. Indeed,
it is the story told about many of these entities, particularly public–private
ones.233 But it may not be true in certain contexts, such as when organizations get stuck in particular modes of acting. Purely public or other central
actors may be more entrepreneurial, boundary organizations may lack the
necessary authority to implement their decisions,234 or organizations may
simply find it easier to operate on one side of the border than on both sides.
Similarly, purely private entities may have even more flexibility than quasiprivate ones. 235 Another context is when power vacuums that insulate
border agencies produce opportunities for nonpublic behavior by such
entities—either because they have special interests of their own or because
other institutions are better able to capture them.236 Semiprivate entities,
for instance, may face little market oversight.237 Market failure offers yet
another context in which purely public entities may outperform partially

230 In fact, many of these entities are not lines in the federal budget requiring governmental
outlays but are self-supporting entities producing revenues for the government.
231 See Daniel Abebe, Rethinking the Costs of International Delegations, 34 U. PA. J. INT’ L L.
491, 522 (2013) (noting that “international institutions can take advantage of the aggregation of
human expertise . . . and the accumulation of institutional knowledge built up over time”).
232 See Rae André, Assessing the Accountability of Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Quangos,
97 J. BUS. ETHICS 271, 280 (2010) (recognizing suggestions that “paying people more than
governments will allow and, offering other private-sector inducements, will attract better
employees”).
233 See MOE, supra note 19, at 44 (describing the corporate governance of “[g]overnment
corporations . . . under the supervision . . . of a department or agency head”).
234 Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 19, at 44.
235 Cf. Yair Aharoni, Performance Evaluation of State-Owned Enterprises: A Process Perspective,
27 MGT. SCI. 1340, 1342 (1981) (noting that state-owned enterprises must meet multiple
objectives, making them less effective).
236 See Doug Bandow, Uncle Sam as Investment Banker: The Failure of Washington’s Overseas
Enterprise Funds (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 260, 1996), available at object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/pubs/pdf/pa260.pdf (arguing that OPIC and government investment fund decisionmakers
suffer from conflicts of interest because of future job possibilities).
237 See Stanton, supra note 76, at 838 (“Because of their government backing, most GSEs
receive only minimal feedback from the markets . . . .”); see also JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE
PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 78 (1989) (noting that competitiveness is more important than whether an entity is public or private).
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private ones. Even if the boundary organizations are self-supporting or raise
money for the government, on net, they often still impose some costs.
Finally, where broader and more central agencies entice more talented
workers, for example, boundary organizations may have less expertise.238
Similar normative analysis can be applied to boundary organizations
other than public–private entities. For instance, interstate compact agencies
and international organizations may be necessary to solve particular problems of collective action and to improve efficiency.239 Such entities may,
however, also be more prone to capture by special interests, undermining
social welfare.240
In short, boundary organizations have tremendous potential in terms of
social welfare. But they are not guaranteed to serve the public’s economic
interest better than other entities.
2. Democratic Legitimacy
A proponent of democratic legitimacy desires, at least in part, accountability.241 Accountability can mean many things; here, I use the term to cover
the “repercussions of government action: government officials . . . may
suffer penalties for ‘misbehavior’ or receive rewards for ‘good behavior,’ both
genuine and perceived.” 242 In other words, accountability encourages
“responsiveness, although not necessarily effectiveness.” 243 Compared to
238
239

André, supra note 232, at 280.
See Hathaway, supra note 199, at 144 (“[S]tates might enter into agreements that delegate
authority to an international body in order to overcome a collective-action dilemma.”).
240 See Hasday, supra note 21, at 24-25 (“Capture by private economic interests is . . . a
perennial problem . . . .”).
241 O’Connell, supra note 42, at 1716.
242 Id. at 1719; see also KOPPELL, supra note 19, at 176 (providing five dimensions of accountability: “transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness”); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance (noting
six important considerations in accountability relationships: “who is liable or accountable to whom;
what they are liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be
assured; by what standards the putatively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the
potential effects are of finding that those standards have been breached”), in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 118 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
243 O’Connell, supra note 42, at 1719. Another perspective views accountability as barring
arbitrary decisionmaking—providing procedural-like protections rather than substantive outcomes. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (arguing that a concern for theorizing agency
legitimacy has obscured the risks of arbitrary agency decisionmaking); B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre,
Public–Private Partnerships and the Democratic Deficit: Is Performance-Based Legitimacy the Answer?
(finding that hybrid entities may meet performance targets but not give sufficient process), in
DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 41
(Magdalena Bexell & Ulrika Mörth eds., 2010).
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other entities, boundary organizations may suffer on this dimension. First,
such organizations may be less transparent.244 This opacity may come from
exemption from governmental disclosure requirements, such as FOIA, or
exemption from information mandates on private entities, such as SEC
requirements. Second, border agencies may face fewer overseers and fuzzier
lines of accountability. After all, it may be easier to evade attention at the
boundary. Alternatively, border agencies may face more overseers, resulting
in less authority or willingness to punish wayward actions.245 Both alternatives would cause boundary organizations to confront fewer, or less severe,
consequences for misbehavior.
As with the promotion of the social welfare story, the unaccountability
narrative is straightforward and popular. 246 The narrative is somewhat
ironic: the attempt to remove entities from politics gives them legitimacy in
some contexts.247 In any event, the reality may be quite different, or at least
more complicated, for boundary organizations. To begin, some boundary
organizations are subject to governmental disclosure requirements while
others face considerable media attention because of the issues they address.
Boundary organizations may confront similar or even more scrutiny than
purely public entities, though through different accountability mechanisms.248 Namely, fewer overseers can result in more vigilant oversight if they
are less willing to free ride off the efforts of others. Alternatively, overseers on
both sides of the boundary may take an active role in supervision. In addition,
border organizations could face greater repercussions for bad actions.249 Each
side of the boundary may exact particular penalties, and it may be easier to
terminate a boundary organization than a core executive agency.
244 See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Spreading Global Risk to American Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1998, at B1 (“OPIC runs its fund program almost exclusively behind closed doors . . . .”).
245 See Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI.
274, 277 (2003) (exploring the effects of redundant jurisdictions on strategic policy actors through
a game-theory model).
246 See MOE, supra note 19, at 44-45 (describing the unaccountability narrative); Jack M.
Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1552 (2001)
(“[T]he appearance and reality of political accountability are placed in doubt when government
power is wielded by entities that are either outside government or only loosely connected to
government.”).
247 See Matthew V. Flinders, Quangos: Why Do Governments Love Them?, in QUANGOS,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM: THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT 26, 30-31
(Matthew V. Flinders & Martin J. Smith eds., 1999).
248 Cf. Freeman, supra note 24, at 665-75 (noting that private entities face specific accountability mechanisms).
249 Contrary to popular assumption, they may also be less tempted to stray from the wishes
of political principals than more central agencies, even keeping punishment fixed. Cf. Abebe, supra
note 231, at 517-18 (analyzing international organizations).
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Concerns about legitimacy may also turn on the nature of the organization’s activities. We may worry more about boundary organizations engaged
in rulemaking and adjudication and less about those engaged in activities
common to private market participants. As discussed above, entities at the
boundary may raise serious democratic concerns. They are not, however,
automatically less accountable than more traditional organizations.
Social welfare and democratic legitimacy are often in tension,250 but they
are not necessarily so. In the conventional story of public–private entities
(and perhaps federal–foreign and federal–state organizations), economic
objectives trump democratic ones. 251 Yet boundary organizations can
promote both efficiency and accountability through explicit design decisions.252 As to social welfare, performance targets may improve substantive
decisions. As to accountability, more auditing by organizations such as the
GAO may be helpful.253 As to both, sunset provisions may foster accountability and prevent capture that undermines social welfare. 254 If design
decisions are made, however, without these goals in mind, boundary entities
could operate in a manner that promotes neither goal.
C. Application of Positive and Normative Theories to
Movement of Organizations
These theories, positive and normative, also apply to the movement of
agencies, which is generally ignored by political scientists and administrative law scholars. Specifically, politicians typically do not expect movement
(including agency termination) when designing an agency. In one standard
account, agency structure (that is established ex ante) controls, at least in part,
agency behavior ex post.255 If agency design and procedures are not durable,
the political bargaining game may shift—players may reach a different
outcome if the time horizon is shorter. In addition, if its “hardwiring” is
softer than imagined, the agency’s decisions as a normative matter may

250
251

KAREN M. HULT, AGENCY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN 3 (1987).
Moe, supra note 38, at 305 (describing the shift away from the view that “accountability to
political leadership and . . . due process in decision making trumps . . . performance and results”).
252 Cf. Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract (listing suggestions for making
privatization more accountable), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 335 ( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
253 See Anthony M. Bertelli, Governing the Quango: An Auditing and Cheating Model of QuasiGovernmental Authorities, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 239, 244-45 (2006) (analyzing the
relationship between auditing requirements and expected levels of “cheating”).
254 See Stanton, supra note 76, at 843 (citing the sunset provisions of the First and Second
Banks of the United States).
255 McCubbins et al., supra note 196, at 433.
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become more or less desirable. For example, if, as David Lewis finds,
“agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other
agencies,” we might be more worried about their lack of accountability.256
On the positive (or predictive) side, agencies that shift structure tend to
move from the center to the boundary, and any shift in this direction may
reflect changes in preferences on both the political control and competence
dimensions.257 On the political control dimension, the costs of more political control may increase relative to the benefits. In times of fiscal constraint,
for example, the desire to push an agency off budget literally decreases the
attractiveness of political control. On the competence dimension, changing
party control of the political branches may increase support for more
private agency structures, though there are considerable transaction costs
attached to changing the structure of an existing agency.258 Typically, there
needs to be something more—perhaps an incident of political mismanagement or failure in a particular area—to spur a shift away from political
actors, no matter which party is in control.259
Though seemingly less common, agencies can also move from the
boundary to the center. Such a change also indicates shifts on these two
dimensions. On the political control dimension, the benefits of more
political control may increase compared to the costs, possibly as a result of
some crisis where voters will reward political actors for taking charge. On
the competence dimension, as with movement toward the boundary,
changing party control may generate support for restructuring. Again, an
incident of mismanagement or failure—at the boundary—could help
overcome transaction costs.
As with the creation of an agency, any movement of an agency may foster
(or undermine) social welfare and democratic legitimacy. All of the above
theories—positive and normative—implicitly assume the legality of boundary
256 Lewis, supra note 141, at 399. The results are a bit confusing. Government commissions, as
a general group, are less durable than classic executive agencies. Id. at 395. But commissions with
fixed terms and party-balancing requirements are “substantially more durable.” Id. at 395-96.
257 HULT, supra note 250, at 5; cf. B. Guy Peters, Government Reorganization: A Theoretical
Analysis, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 199, 206 (1992) (summarizing another theory of government
reorganization as a result of “social, economic or technological changes” (emphasis omitted)).
258 See James G. March & Johan P. Olson, Organizing Political Life: What Administrative Reorganization Tells Us About Government, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 281, 281 (1983) (finding a number of
piecemeal changes to agencies and very little comprehensive reorganization). This claim presumes
that it is more likely that agency structure will shift toward the boundary when power shifts from
Democrats to Republicans than agency structure will move toward the center when power shifts
from Republicans to Democrats. Republicans may care more about government structure than
Democrats, which would support such an assumption.
259 See LIGHT, supra note 194, at 188-89 (highlighting how making agency programs more
private allowed the government programs to be saved in some form).
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organizations. Yet law can also shape the positive constraints of agency design
as well as the normative implications.260 The next Part takes up that topic.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS
Boundary agencies—with ties to the market, another sovereign, or another
branch—are prevalent in the administrative state. Yet they are not easily
defined in the law: for example, an agency for constitutional purposes does
not mirror an agency for statutory purposes, and an entity can be an agency
under one statute but not another. They also display some variation in terms
of executive and congressional oversight. For these boundary agencies,
labels have consequences, and the authority to label can be significant. But
with Congress labeling agencies for many statutory commands, the courts
determining constitutional (and, if Congress is not explicit, statutory)
status, and the White House marking executive obligations, the result is
often a confusing list of legal attributes for any given boundary organization. In short, an organization may be a government entity for some purposes but not for others.261
Take Amtrak as an example. The Supreme Court accepted Congress’s
decision to exempt Amtrak from the APA,262 and the D.C. Circuit extended
that decision to exempt Amtrak from the False Claims Act.263 But the
Supreme Court refused to defer to Congress when it came to constitutional
obligations, finding Amtrak subject to the First Amendment.264 In July 2013,
the D.C. Circuit held that “just because [the Supreme Court] treated
Amtrak as a government agency for purposes of the First Amendment does
not dictate the same result with respect to all other constitutional provisions.”265 The D.C. Circuit then concluded that Amtrak is a private entity
for purposes of Congress’s ability to delegate regulatory authority because
of its power to “seek profit on behalf of private interests.”266 As such, the
260 Cf. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1314-15 (2003) (calling for public law mandates to cover purely private entities performing
government functions).
261 Cf. Ronald C. Moe, United States (noting, incorrectly, that “[i]f the entity is not an agency
of the United States [under Title 5], it comes under private law”), in DISTRIBUTED PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE: AGENCIES, AUTHORITIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT BODIES 243, 254
(Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. ed., 2002).
262 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (holding that Congress’s decision was “dispositive of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for purposes of matters
that are within Congress’s control”).
263 United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
264 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394, 400.
265 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
266 Id. at 677.
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D.C. Circuit struck down part of the Passenger Rail Investment and
Improvement Act of 2008 as an unconstitutional delegation.267
The Smithsonian Institution provides another useful example of the
confusing legal status of boundary organizations. Courts have determined,
sometimes in dicta, that it is a government entity entitled to sovereign
immunity,268 a federal agency for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),269 an instrumentality of the federal government under the Federal
Employment Compensation Act,270 and a designated federal entity under
the Inspector General Act.271 The OLC has added the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act to that list.272 Courts have ruled, however, that
it is not a federal agency for purposes of the Privacy Act273 or the APA.274
Furthermore, the Smithsonian does not have to meet state insurance and
licensing requirements in seeking annuities.275 The OLC has concluded that
because of the Smithsonian’s “unique” nature, its status should be determined statute by statute.276
Amtrak and the Smithsonian are not unique in their ambiguity, as far as
boundary organizations go. The Red Cross is immune from local taxes as a
federal instrumentality but is not subject to FOIA.277 The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acts in various capacities, including as an
insurer, regulator, receiver, and purchaser.278 In O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
the Supreme Court ruled that the FDIC, as a receiver, could not rely on
federal common law.279 The Court remarked that “the FDIC is not the
United States.”280 Some lower courts have simply applied that statement
directly so long as the FDIC is functioning as a receiver.281 Other lower
267
268

Id.
Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289, 295, 296
app. A-1 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (panel opinion affirmed en banc and included in appendix).
269 Id. at 296 app. A-1.
270 Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
271 Id.
272 Immunity of Smithsonian Inst. from State Ins. Laws, 21 Op. O.L.C. 81, 82 (1997).
273 Dong, 125 F.3d at 879.
274 Immunity of Smithsonian, 21 Op. O.L.C. at 83.
275 See id. at 84 (explaining that a state may not regulate the United States directly and determining that application of state insurance laws to the Smithsonian would constitute direct
regulation of the United States).
276 Id. at 86 n.7.
277 United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1990).
278 Adam Shajnfeld, An Identity in Disarray: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Government-Agency Status, 128 BANKING L.J. 36, 37-38 (2011).
279 512 U.S. 79, 83 (1994) (noting the FDIC’s special status is no reason to create a judicial
exception to the post-Erie rule that state law governs).
280 Id. at 85.
281 Shajnfeld, supra note 278, at 39.
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courts have rejected such a broad reading of the statement.282 The result:
“the farrago of decisions regarding the FDIC’s identity—even without
O’Melveny’s statement—are not conducive to distillation of any coherent
rule.”283
Most recently, the DRBC has generated some important legal challenges.
After the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires
federal agencies to assess environmental consequences of their actions, took
effect in 1970, the DRBC issued regulations to comply.284 A decade later, the
DRBC suspended its regulations for budgetary reasons—choosing to rely
instead on traditional federal agencies to perform analyses for its projects—
before formally repealing the regulations in 1997.285 In late September 2012,
the Eastern District of New York ruled that although the APA did not cover
the DRBC, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity did.286 By finding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing, however, the court did not have to address a
number of other difficult issues, including whether the DRBC is a federal
agency.287
What becomes evident rather quickly is the lack of clear legal rules, even
within a particular category of boundary organizations. For instance, in a
recent survey of government corporations, the GAO had to rely on selfreports to determine which of fifteen statutes (including the APA and
FOIA, among others) applied to each respondent.288 Some corporations
complied with as few as two statutes; others with as many as fourteen.289
Although this lack of clarity may keep the OLC busy,290 it is not ideal for
agency governance.
To be clear, flexibility in agency design has benefits. Government corporations may be the best choice for some situations; independent regulatory
commissions are optimal for others. I do not take a position here on whether
there are too many types of administrative entities,291 but I do posit that
within these basic agency types, clarity on legal obligations (particularly
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Id.
Id. at 41.
New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 184, 189.
Id. at 197-98.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 29-30, 34-37.
Id. at 34-37.
See, e.g., Status of Nat’l Veterans Bus. Dev. Corp., 2004 WL 3554703, at *4-5 (O.L.C.
Mar. 19, 2004) (considering whether the NVBDC is a government corporation).
291 Cf. Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law (noting and explaining the “‘closed
number’ of property forms”), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE E CONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 148, 148 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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statutory mandates) could make the organization’s performance more
predictable and its oversight more consistent. Ex ante clarity on legal rules
for organizations cannot be perfect, of course. Some boundary organizations
generate judicial challenges, and the courts serve as an ex post agency
designer, modifying agency structures to comport with legal mandates as
the Supreme Court did in Free Enterprise.
In this Part, I consider first the constitutional and common law of
boundary organizations, discussing their legality as well as their obligations
and defenses. I then examine the most relevant statutes to these entities,
including those governing jurisdiction in the federal courts and those
targeting agency action. I also consider the applicability of other governance
mechanisms, such as presidential directives, the budget process, and litigation authority. Finally, I use these boundary organizations to reconsider
some classic issues in constitutional and administrative law.
A. Constitutional and Common Law Implications
The constitutional status of a federal agency, whether located centrally
within the Executive Branch or more peripherally, depends on several core
doctrines. The positive authority for creation is typically straightforward,
but that authority must not infringe on the separation of powers, the
nondelegation doctrine, and the Appointments Clause, among other
principles. These constraints operate in conventional as well as surprising
ways for boundary organizations.
1. Legality of Boundary Organizations
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can enact laws needed
to carry out its legislative powers, 292 which include the delegation of
intelligible tasks to the administrative state. Specifically, Congress can
create a range of agencies, including those at the federal government’s
boundaries, to carry out these functions.293 There are, however, constitutional limits on this power. I focus here on constraints rooted in general

292
293

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819) (“The power of establishing
a corporation is not a distinct sovereign power or end of government, but only the means of
carrying into effect other powers which are sovereign.”); see also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 771 (1824) (“All the powers of the government must be carried into operation
by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with
individuals.”).
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separation of powers principles, the nondelegation doctrine, and the
Appointments Clause.294
a. Separation of Powers
Under separation of powers principles, no single branch can aggrandize
its power beyond what the Constitution permits. Relatedly, no branch can
encroach on the authority of another branch. These principles are more
relevant to boundary organizations at the interstices of the branches of the
federal government than to entities at intergovernmental borders or the
public–private divide. Indeed, many important separation of powers cases
involve boundary organizations entirely within the federal government.295
Organizations at the Legislative Branch’s borders seem to face the most
skepticism under a separation of powers analysis. The original structures of
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the MWAA, for instance, did
not survive because of improper connections to Congress. 296 And the
structure of the GAO, where Congress controls removal of the agency’s
leader, prevented Congress from delegating executive authority to cut
deficits to the GAO.297 More recently, the OLC warned that requirements
that entities concurrently report to the President and Congress “impair the
Constitution’s ‘great principle of unity and responsibility in the Executive

294 Another constraint would be Article III, particularly for federal–international adjudicatory
entities. For example, the National Council for Industrial Defense filed a lawsuit arguing that the
binational panels under the United States–Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) violate Article
III. Nat’l Council for Indus. Def., Inc. v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1993). The
lawsuit was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 797. Compare Patrick Tangney, The New
Internationalism: The Cession of Sovereign Competences to Supranational Organizations and Constitutional
Change in the United States and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 395, 447 (1996) (finding “the
constitutionality of the FTA panels . . . highly questionable”), with Kristina Daugirdas,
International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L. REV. 707, 739 (2007) (finding no
separation of powers issue). Under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stern v. Marshall, which
took a formalist approach to such questions in the bankruptcy context, such federal–foreign
boundary organizations seem more at risk. See generally 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
295 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396-97 (1989) (upholding congressional
delegation of power to the Sentencing Commission); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34
(1986) (invalidating Congress’s delegation to an entity over which Congress exerted some control
through removal).
296 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 276-77 (1991) (finding that a provision creating a “Board of Review” composed of
members of Congress with veto power over MWAA’s decisions violated separation of powers
principles); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that the composition
of the FEC was improper because its members were “Officers of the United States” but not
properly appointed under the Appointments Clause).
297 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34.
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Department.’”298 Obligations to multiple branches, particularly where one
of those branches is Congress, could therefore impermissibly weaken
another branch’s authority.
Removal restrictions imposed by statute on less conventional agencies
have run into difficulty as well. For one, the Supreme Court struck down
the bar on the SEC’s authority to remove PCAOB members.299 Additionally,
the D.C. Circuit recently severed the for-cause restriction on the Librarian
of Congress’s power to remove judges on the Copyright Royalty Board, an
institution at the border of the Legislative and Executive Branches.300
While much attention is given to the branches’ attempts to expand their
authority, it is sometimes in one branch’s interest to place a boundary entity
squarely in another branch. For example, the OLC, which sits within the
Department of Justice, recently emphasized that the GAO was a Legislative
Branch agency in arguing that Congress had acquiesced to certain recess
appointments that the Executive Branch wanted to defend. Specifically, the
Comptroller General, the head of the GAO, ruled that the Pay Act permits
compensation of those appointed “during periods when the Senate is not
actually sitting and is not available to give its advice and consent . . . ,
irrespective of whether the recess . . . is attributable to a final adjournment sine die or to an adjournment to a specified date.”301 By placing the
GAO in the Legislative Branch, the OLC equated the Comptroller General’s Pay Act ruling with congressional acceptance of intrasession recess
appointments. 302 The D.C. Circuit, however, dismissed this argument in
striking down President Obama’s intrarecess appointments.303
As reflected above, boundary organizations help distinguish the two
primary approaches to separation of powers questions. A formalist approach,
which focuses on structural attributes in defining the constitutional boundaries

298 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 175 (1996) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 131 (1926)).
299 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010); see
also Peter Conti-Brown, Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional?, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/is-the-federal-reserve-constitutional (arguing that the
Federal Open Market Committee, the part of the Federal Reserve Bank that sets monetary policy,
is unconstitutional because the “President cannot remove members of the FOMC without
reaching through two explicit for-cause removal restrictions, on top of a third layer of at-will
removability”).
300 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1340 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
301 Appointments—Recess Appointments, 28 Comp. Gen. 30, 37 (1948).
302 Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding
Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 2012 WL 168645, at *7 (O.L.C. Jan. 6, 2012).
303 Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 514 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
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among the three branches, 304 would find many boundary organizations
problematic. 305 By contrast, a functionalist approach, which considers
practical effects on the balance of powers,306 would generally find them
acceptable, though not always. The prevalence of boundary organizations
therefore suggests that formalist jurisprudence, if adopted more extensively,
could radically transform the administrative state.
b. Nondelegation Doctrine
There are two manifestations of the nondelegation doctrine. First, Congress cannot delegate legislative authority to another branch. So long as
Congress provides an “intelligible principle” to guide its delegation of
authority to a government actor, there is no delegation of legislative
authority.307 This manifestation does not affect boundary organizations any
differently than other organizations. Second, Congress cannot delegate
significant authority to a private actor.308 This manifestation, by contrast,
does affect boundary organizations differently. The difference had, however,

304 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1958 (2011).
305 See KU & YOO, supra note 22, at 74-75 (finding separation of powers problems with
international organizations); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism,
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight
of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1618-29 (2012) (suggesting
that, if Free Enterprise is read to require presidential control over execution of all federal law,
cooperative federalism programs are likely unconstitutional).
306 Manning, supra note 304, at 1951-52.
307 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
308 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). Some argue that Congress also cannot
delegate to international bodies. Ku, supra note 22, at 121; cf. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA,
464 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The legal status of ‘decisions’ of this sort appears to be a question
of first impression. There is significant debate over the constitutionality of assigning lawmaking
functions to international bodies. A holding that the Parties’ post-ratification side agreements
[under the Montreal Protocol] were ‘law’ would raise serious constitutional questions in light of
the nondelegation doctrine, numerous constitutional procedural requirements for making law, and
the separation of powers.” (internal citations omitted)). Alexander Volokh has recently argued that
Carter Coal should be seen as a due process—not as a nondelegation—decision. Alexander Volokh,
The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Nondelegation, Due Process, and Antitrust Challenges, HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 35, 37), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
id=2335659. Under his reasoning, the D.C. Circuit reached the right result but with the wrong
reasoning. Id. (manuscript at 41). This argument would make any agency that considers profit
motives potentially unconstitutional. Id.; see also Froomkin, supra note 13, at 575 (noting that the
delegation label for Carter Coal is “misleading” because, rather than relying on separation of powers,
the doctrine “seeks to prevent private individuals from judging or regulating their own causes”).
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long been a theoretical one. The Carter Coal decision that established the rule
dated to 1935 and was considered a “dormant” doctrine until summer 2013.309
In July 2013, the D.C. Circuit struck down section 207 of the Passenger
Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 for delegating legislative
authority to Amtrak, which it determined to be a private entity.310 Section
207 mandates that Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration
“jointly . . . develop new or improve existing metrics and minimum
standards for measuring the performance and service quality of intercity
passenger train operations.”311
The decision is an odd one—a second attempt, perhaps, at reviving the
nondelegation doctrine, this time in its private manifestation. The D.C.
Circuit conceded that “[m]any of the details of Amtrak’s makeup support
the government’s position that it is not a private entity of the sort described
in Carter Coal.”312 Most critically, the Supreme Court held in Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. that Amtrak was a governmental actor for
the purposes of the First Amendment. 313 The D.C. Circuit, however,
pointed to Amtrak’s corporate characteristics (including that, “somewhat
tellingly, Amtrak’s website is www.amtrak.com—not www.amtrak.gov”).314
The court distinguished Lebron:
Just as it is impermissible for Congress to employ the corporate form to
sidestep the First Amendment, neither may it reap the benefits of delegating
regulatory authority while absolving the federal government of all responsibility for its exercise. The federal government cannot have its cake and eat it
too. In any event, Lebron’s holding was comparatively narrow, deciding only
that Amtrak is an agency of the United States for the purpose of the First
Amendment. It did not opine on Amtrak’s status with respect to the federal
government’s structural powers under the Constitution—the issue here.315

309 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1440
(2003) (“[W]hile Carter’s constitutional prohibition on private delegations thus remains alive in
theory, it is all but dead in practice.”); see also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 388 (1940) (permitting private parties to propose regulations); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1,
15 (1939) (upholding the Tobacco Inspection Act where Congress conditioned regulations by the
Secretary of Agriculture in a given market on approval by “two-thirds of the growers voting”); Ku,
supra note 22, at 120 (“[W]ith a few exceptions in the now distant past, courts have refused to
adopt a formalist analysis of delegations from the federal government to non-federal actors.”).
310 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
311 Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 207(a),
122 Stat. 4907, 4916.
312 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 721 F.3d at 674.
313 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995).
314 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 721 F.3d at 675.
315 Id. at 676-77 (citation omitted).
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Even putting aside the machinations the court went through to distinguish Lebron, it seems a stretch to liken Amtrak to a purely private entity,
which is a course the court had to take to strike down the statute under
Carter Coal. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), assuming the Commerce Department does not retain control
over its decisions, seems more susceptible to a nondelegation doctrine
challenge under Carter Coal.316
The D.C. Circuit’s attempted revival of the second nondelegation doctrine depends on a formalist approach. Under this approach, delegations of
regulatory authority to entities at the public–private, federal–state, and
federal–international boundaries could be questioned.317 Gillian Metzger’s
theory on purely private entities might provide a middle ground between
eliminating large portions of the administrative state and permitting vast
delegations to quasi-federal entities. Metzger proposes that if “delegation
creates an agency relationship between the private actor and the government,” courts would need to “assess whether the delegation is adequately
structured to preserve constitutional accountability.”318 This approach could
work for boundary organizations as well.319
c. Appointments Clause
Under the Appointments Clause, the President must nominate, with
Senate confirmation, all principal officers.320 The Clause allows Congress to
alter this mandate for inferior officers by assigning appointment power in
“the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”321 Because the leaders of boundary organizations are often selected
in less typical ways than officials of classic agencies—for instance by shareholders or states—these organizations highlight some critical questions.
316 See Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 20, at 148-50 (noting major similarities between
ICANN and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act at issue in Carter Coal).
317 See Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. O.L.C.
248, 250 (1989) (“One of the gravest new threats to executive branch power is Congress’s growing
penchant for assigning the executive power to persons who are not part of the executive branch.”),
superseded by The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 124 (1996).
318 Metzger, supra note 309, at 1486.
319 This subsection has focused on congressional delegation to a boundary organization. A
related doctrine, subdelegation, addresses agency delegation to such entities. See Defenders of
Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the Coast Guard could
not subdelegate to the International Maritime Organization without evidence of congressional
intent).
320 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
321 Id.
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First, boundary entities lead to prominent disagreements about who
qualifies as an officer. There is consensus that exercising significant federal
authority is a necessary condition for being an officer. But what happens
when that authority is wielded by an international, state, or private official? 322 In one view, propounded by the Clinton Administration, “[t]he
Appointments Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is
devolved upon non-federal actors,” 323 such as state officials or private
parties. In another view, propounded by the George H.W. Bush Administration, the Clause could come into play.324 The governing OLC view is
that “a position, however labeled, is in fact a federal office if (1) it is invested
by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal
Government, and (2) it is ‘continuing.’”325 The text seems open to either
view described above, but the OLC memorandum makes clear that contractors and state officials are ordinarily excluded.326 Contractors seem to be an
easier case than state officials, under the OLC’s reasoning.327
Following the Clinton Administration’s view, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that state officials on the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Conservation
Planning Council (an organization formed by an interstate compact) are not
officers, regardless of whether they exercise federal power.328 Similarly, the
“members of multinational or international entities who are not appointed
to represent the United States” are not officers.329 Under the senior Bush
Administration’s view, however, these officials would be officers if they apply

322
323

See Ku, supra note 22, at 117-18 (noting that the Supreme Court has not resolved this question).
The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 145 (1996).
324 See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 252, at 310, 318.
325 Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 2007 WL
1405459, at *1 (O.L.C. Apr. 16, 2007).
326 Id. at *18, *20.
327 Id. (“[A]lthough it is true as a general matter that contractors do not hold an office under
the United States, the reason for that (in most cases) is that they do not exercise any delegated
sovereign authority. . . . [S]tate officers ordinarily do not possess delegated sovereign authority
of the federal Government, even when they assist in the administration of federal law. . . . State
officers, even when enforcing federal law, generally exercise the sovereign law enforcement
authority of their State, ultimately delegated by the people of that State; if they hold any office,
they are officers of their State or locality, not of the United States. They hold authority independently of a delegation from the federal Government, and they and those who appoint them are
accountable for their actions to the people of the State.”).
328 Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council,
786 F.2d 1359, 1364-66 (9th Cir. 1986).
329 The Constitutional Separation of Powers, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 146.
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federal law. 330 To the extent that nonvoting members wield significant
authority, this issue also arises in the recent Dodd–Frank legislation.331 That
Act created the FSOC, tasked with regulating risks to financial stability.
The FSOC’s structure has generated an Appointments Clause challenge
because three of the five nonvoting members are state officials.332
Even under the Clinton Administration’s view, federal actors exercising
significant federal authority at the boundary must meet the requirements of
the Appointments Clause.333 Boundary organizations can create two different
(but related) legal disputes for these requirements: determining whether
their officials are federal officials and, if so, whether they exercise sufficient
federal power. While directors of corporations owned entirely by the
government seem to be federal, directors of corporations only partially
owned by the government may not be.334 The OLC, for example, determined that the directors of the Communications Satellite Corporation, a
privately owned government corporation that later merged with Lockheed
Martin, were not federal actors—and therefore were not subject to the
Appointments Clause.335
It can also be difficult to determine if officials (assuming they are federal)
exercise enough federal power to fall under the Appointments Clause. In
striking down the Board of Review in the original design of the MWAA,
the court determined that, although the states had created it through a
compact, the Board exercised significant federal power. 336 Significant
authority is a separate requirement, and the state officials serving on the
FSOC may fail to meet the first Bush Administration’s definition of officers
on that ground.
A second question boundary organizations raise under the Appointments
Clause is what counts as a department. As a starting point, a department

330 See Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral
Review Under the United States–Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455,
1481-82 (1992) (discussing the applicability of the Appointments Clause to the panelists on a
binational panel).
331 See supra note 121.
332 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 89-91, 132, State Nat’l Bank of
Big Spring v. Geithner, 2013 WL 3945027 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1032), 2012 WL 2365284.
333 As discussed below, if any entity is seen as part of the federal government for the Bill of
Rights, it should arguably also be seen as part of the federal government for structural mandates.
The Constitutional Separation of Powers, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 148 n.70.
334 See Breger & Edles, supra note 31, at 1228-29 (describing the differences between wholly
owned federal government corporations and mixed-ownership corporations).
335 Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 165 (1962).
336 Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 845 F. Supp. 902, 907-08 (D.D.C.), aff ’ d, 36
F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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must be executive in nature.337 The D.C. Circuit recently ruled that judges
on the Copyright Royalty Board are proper inferior officers if the Librarian
of Congress, who appoints them, can remove them at will.338 Although the
decision focused on the statutory removal restriction, which the court struck
down, it also relied on a determination that the Librarian of Congress was a
proper head of a department who could appoint an inferior officer.339 The
Library of Congress, however, is not listed as part of the Executive Branch
in any official classification. Many, including the OLC, label the Library of
Congress a legislative agency.340
To reach its holding that the Librarian was a proper head of a department under the Appointments Clause, the court reasoned that, while the
Library performs some legislative tasks, the President’s power to appoint
and remove the Librarian and the Library’s power to promulgate copyright
regulations make it a “component of the Executive Branch.”341 The court
had to rely on classifying functions: an agency can, in this view, be an
executive department for some purposes but not for others.342
Third (and connected to the second point), boundary organizations raise
questions about who counts as a head of a department under the Appointments Clause. To uphold the leadership structure of the USPS, the Ninth
Circuit had to find that the Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster
General were inferior officers and that the nine governors appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate were the head of the USPS.343 For
the Postmaster General, selected by the nine governors, the reasoning rests
on deeming the nine governors the head of the department even though the
Postmaster General has an equal vote (to each Governor) on decisions. The
court found that because the Postmaster General is “the management alter
ego” of the governors, “the structure of the organization and the nature of
337 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that “neither Congress
nor its officers were included within the language ‘Heads of Departments’” in the Appointments
Clause).
338 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1340-41 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
339 Id. at 1341-42.
340 See The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 172 (1996) (“Most of the functions undertaken by the Library of Congress . . . can
comfortably be described as in aid of the legislative process.”).
341 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 684 F.3d at 1341-42; see also Keeffe v. Library of Cong., 777 F.2d
1573, 1574 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (referring to the Library of Congress as a “congressional agency”).
342 Cf. Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 2011 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 966 (Dec. 23, 2011) (refusing to comply with a statutory provision conditioning funds
to the Library of Congress on use by “the Copyright Office, which performs an executive function
in administering the copyright laws”).
343 Silver v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1038-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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his position place clear boundaries on how this vote can be cast.”344 For the
Deputy Postmaster General, selected by the nine governors and the Postmaster General, the reasoning is more complicated—the Postmaster General’s involvement in selection must be seen not to disturb the earlier
reasoning.345 The boundary nature of the USPS thus makes the analysis
quite complicated.346
There are other related issues. Boundary organizations also generate
confusion under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, which governs
how President-appointed, Senate-confirmed positions can be filled with
temporary acting officials.347 According to the OLC, the U.S. representatives to the IBRD and to the International Monetary Fund are not covered
by the Act but the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
is.348 In addition, certain boundary organizations seem particularly prone to
confirmation battles, resulting in large numbers of recess appointments.349
2. Obligations and Defenses of Boundary Organizations
Many constitutional obligations apply only to state actors. Allgovernment entities, whether boundary organizations or not, easily qualify as
state actors. Only boundary organizations at the government–nongovernment
divide present challenges. The primary question for boundary organizations
at the public–private border, therefore, is whether they are sufficiently
public to fall under the obligations imposed on, and defenses provided to,
government actors.

344
345
346

Id. at 1040-41.
Id.
See id. at 1044 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“Congress could not have intended nine
members of the Board to be the head of department for Appointments Clause purposes while
intending all eleven members to be head of department for purposes of running the Postal
Service.”). Similar issues seem to arise with the FOMC. See Conti-Brown, supra note 299.
347 The Act applies to “an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment,” but excludes members of FERC, the Surface Transportation Board, and a
“board, commission, or similar entity that . . . is composed of multiple members[]
and . . . governs an independent establishment or Government corporation.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 105,
3349c (2012).
348 See Applicability of the Fed. Vacancies Reform Act to Vacancies at the Int’l Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, 24 Op. O.L.C. 58, 58, 61 (2000).
349 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R ECESS APPOINTMENTS BY PRESIDENT CARTER,
JANUARY 20, 1977–JANUARY 20, 1981 (1984); Neil A. Lewis, Still No End to Turmoil at Legal
Services, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at 10 (discussing the senior Bush Administration’s appointments to the Legal Services Corporation).
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a. Obligations
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the analysis of when the
actions of boundary and other entities are governmental actions has “not
been a model of consistency.”350 The Supreme Court, for example, split as to
whether the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) was covered by
the Equal Protection Clause.351 In that case, the majority ruled that the
USOC was not a government actor under the Constitution.352 Specifically,
the Court noted that the boundary organization managed “amateur sports,”
a nontraditional function, and that the government did not exercise sufficient control over it.353 Four justices, however, found the entity to be a
governmental actor. They believed the USOC was sufficiently governmental
because, among other factors, “it represents this Nation to the world
community” and the federal government was involved in its decision to
boycott the 1980 Olympic Games.354
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, however, a divided
Supreme Court ruled that Amtrak was an instrumentality of the United
States “for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution.” 355 This holding conflicted with the statute
creating Amtrak, which explicitly stated that Amtrak was not a government
agency.356 The Court recounted the history of government corporations,
concluding that these entities had been considered part of the government.357 The Court also noted a series of factors that constitutionally tied
Amtrak to the government. First, Amtrak was created by a special statute
explicitly to further federal governmental objectives.358 Second, its leadership structure had considerable ties to the Executive Branch. At that time,
the President directly appointed six of the nine directors, four with Senate
confirmation; the Secretary of Transportation chose two, and the last was
the President of Amtrak, chosen by the other directors.359 In sum, the Court
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358

Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995).
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1987).
Id. at 542-47.
Id. at 545-47.
Id. at 550, 552 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
513 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 387-94.
Id. at 397; see also Beermann, supra note 20, at 178 (“It is difficult to imagine a government
corporation that is not formed to advance a governmental policy. While some policies might seem
somewhat peripheral, such as the United States Olympic Committee’s function of administering
the United States’ entries in the Olympic Games, it would seem difficult for courts to distinguish
between government corporations that advance government policies and those that do not.”).
359 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397.
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held that “where . . . the Government creates a corporation by special law,
for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First
Amendment.”360
The next year, the Supreme Court declined to hear a case where the
Ninth Circuit held that Freddie Mac was not a state actor under the Constitution. 361 The Ninth Circuit determined that although “Freddie Mac’s
purposes are ‘federal governmental objectives[,]’ . . . the level of government control over the corporation is so much lower than that exercised over
Amtrak.” 362 Unlike Amtrak, where the government chooses most of the
directors, shareholders choose thirteen of Freddie Mac’s eighteen directors.363 In the Ninth Circuit decision, each factor of the Lebron analysis was
necessary for constitutional obligations to attach. Some courts have followed that approach,364 while others have focused on particular prongs.365 A
holistic approach might yield more consistent outcomes.366
Even if an entity is not a state actor, it could still be liable under the
Constitution if its actions are state actions.367 Thus, courts confronting a
constitutional challenge to a boundary organization must first determine
whether the entity is a state actor, and, if not, turn to whether the challenged

360 Id. at 400. Lower courts had reached different results about other government corporations before the Lebron decision. See, e.g., Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940
F.2d 685, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“LSC, which is entrusted with the duty to administer a federal
statute and to interpret its terms, is a state actor for First Amendment purposes when it issues
regulations pursuant to that statute.”); Warren v. Gov’t Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 611 F.2d. 1229, 1232-35
(8th Cir. 1980) (“Since federal government regulation was not directly and substantially linked to
the challenged foreclosure activity complained of by plaintiff and at issue here, no ‘federal
government action’ exists and plaintiff has no cognizable constitutional claim under the fifth
amendment.”).
361 Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1406 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 812 (1996).
362 Id. at 1407-09.
363 Id. at 1407.
364 See, e.g., Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 188 (D. Conn.
1998) (following the Lebron approach); see also Abu-Jamal v. Nat’l Pub. Radio, 1997 WL 527349, at
*4 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1997) (“At least two circuits have held, or at least presumed, that all three
Lebron prongs need be met for private corporations to be considered governmental actors.”).
365 See, e.g., Barrios-Velazquez v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de
Puerto Rico, 84 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing application of the third prong); AbuJamal, 1997 WL 527349, at *4 (same).
366 Beermann, supra note 20, at 179.
367 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (explaining that state action
may occur if an entity provides an “essential public service”).
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action is state action.368 The two analyses are similar but not identical. Until
recently, some courts considered the following factors in determining
whether action by a private entity qualified as state action: “(1) the nexus
between the government and the challenged action, (2) whether the alleged
government actor performed functions traditionally reserved to the government, and (3) whether the government coerced or encouraged the
challenged action.”369
In 2001, the Supreme Court ignored these tests for state action and applied
a seemingly new test in analyzing whether the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association, a “statewide association incorporated to regulate
interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary
schools,” could be sued for constitutional violations after placing a school’s
athletic program on probation and barring two teams from competition.370
The majority found this conduct constituted state action because “[t]he
nominally private character of the Association [was] overborne by the
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its
composition and workings.”371 The dissent noted the new test372 but argued
a multifactor test should be used instead. 373 This decision leaves lower
courts with more factors to consider. The Second Circuit subsequently
noted that there was “no single test” but rather a “host of facts” that might
justify holding an entity liable for constitutional violations.374 The multifactor approach fits more comfortably with functionalist approaches to constitutional questions.
More generally, Lebron means that boundary organizations potentially
face two complicated analyses: whether they are part of the state and, if not,
whether they engage in state action. The courts, not Congress, determine a
boundary organization’s status for constitutional obligations. Yet Congress

368 See, e.g., Barrios-Velazquez, 84 F.3d at 492-95 (finding that AEELA is neither a state actor
nor engaged in state action); Am. Bankers, 75 F.3d at 1406, 1410-11 (holding that Freddie Mac is
neither a state actor nor engaged in state action); Hack, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (finding that Yale is
neither a state actor nor engaged in state action). Sometimes, courts call the former analysis the
“structural” analysis and the latter analysis the “functional” analysis. Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,
86 F.3d 919, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1996). With boundary entities, both questions are meaningful. Cf.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (focusing on the state action
question with no examination of the state actor issue for non-boundary organization); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (same).
369 Hall, 86 F.3d at 922.
370 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 288, 290 (2001).
371 Id. at 298.
372 Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
373 Id. at 309-11.
374 Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009).
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can assign statutory obligations.375 The result, therefore, is that Amtrak is an
agency for the First Amendment but not for the APA, the False Claims Act,
and perhaps the nondelegation doctrine. If Congress does not expressly
exclude a boundary organization from the APA or a similar statute, however,
the organization’s constitutional status as a government agency generally
determines its statutory status as well. These issues are not just theoretical;
they are raised in recent litigation.376
b. Defenses
In addition to constitutional obligations, boundary organizations present
interesting questions about governmental defenses. Such defenses include
special protections (such as deliberative process) within litigation and
immunity from suit (and from state law obligations). In recent years, the
Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals have wrestled with a number of
these issues.
One significant question is whether an entity has immunity from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. Agencies formed by interstate compacts
have generated two Supreme Court cases. In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court refused to apply sovereign immunity to the compact agency:
Unless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new
agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the
States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose, there
would appear to be no justification for reading additional meaning into the
limited language of the Amendment.377

In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., the Court also refused to
give the compact agency the protection of the Eleventh Amendment,
pointing out that the relevant states “lack financial responsibility for the
Port Authority” and “bear no legal liability for Port Authority debts.”378 Yet
375 The Court made a similar distinction in the ACA case, between a tax for constitutional
purposes and a tax for the Anti-Injunction Act. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2583 (2012).
376 Another recent constitutional challenge to a boundary organization was Lance Armstrong’s lawsuit against the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency for due process violations in conducting its
investigation and releasing its findings. Complaint and Jury Demand at paras. 4, 9, Armstrong v.
Tygart, 886 F. Supp. 2d 572 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (No. 12-0606), 2012 WL 2688774. The district court
dismissed the complaint but did not decide the agency’s constitutional status. Armstrong, 886 F.
Supp. 2d at 591.
377 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979).
378 513 U.S. 30, 45-46 (1994).
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the Court did not rule out that other compact agencies could qualify for
such protection. The D.C. Circuit has held, for instance, that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority has sovereign immunity from
suit.379 This issue also arises frequently for public–private boundary organizations at the state level. In July 2013, for example, the Sixth Circuit barred
the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia from claiming sovereign immunity
in a dispute over the price of natural gas.380
Similar questions arise regarding federal immunity for government corporations and other public–private entities. The D.C. Circuit ruled that the
American Institute in Taiwan, “a unique entity through which the United
States performs consular services on Taiwan and conducts commercial,
cultural, and other relations with the people on Taiwan, enjoys sovereign
immunity from a qui tam suit brought by the Institute's former Managing
Director.”381 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit ruled that Federal Prisons Industries, Inc., a government corporation, is entitled to sovereign immunity,
absent congressional waiver.382 The Third Circuit, by contrast, ruled that the
“Red Cross does not share sovereign immunity with the United States such
that jury trials in personal injury suits would be inconsistent with, or
interfere with, the role outlined in the organization’s charter.” 383 Other
related questions include whether public–private organizations are immune
from federal antitrust laws, 384 and whether public–private entities are
immune from local taxation as instrumentalities of the United States.385

379
380

Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 222 (1986).
Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth. of Ga., 723 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2013). See also
United States ex rel. Lesinski v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 739 F.3d 598, 602-05 (11th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the South Florida Water Management District was an “arm of the state” entitled to
immunity); United States ex rel. King v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston, 2013 WL
5881083, at *8-9 (5th Cir. Nov. 4 2013) (finding the University of Texas Health Science Center to
be an “arm of the state” entitled to immunity from False Claims Act suits).
381 Wood ex rel. U.S. v. Am. Inst. in Taiwan, 286 F.3d 526, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
382 Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
383 Marcella v. Brandywine Hosp., 47 F.3d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1995).
384 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010
(2013) (“[W]e recognize state-action immunity only when it is clear that the challenged anticompetitive conduct is undertaken pursuant to a regulatory scheme that ‘is the State’s own.’”); see also
Volokh, supra note 308, (manuscript at 43-60) (discussing division among the Courts of Appeals on
antitrust challenges to state regulatory boards (such as the North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners), a form of boundary organization). The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a case
involving the North Carolina quasi agency. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
No. 13-534, 82 U.S.L.W. 3260 (2013), granting cert. to N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
385 See, e.g., United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the American Red Cross was not subject to local taxation).
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Additionally, certain boundary officials who do not qualify as officers
under the Appointments Clause may still be entitled to protections under
the qualified immunity doctrine. This doctrine, which prevents government
and some other officials from having to defend their actions in court,
“protect[s] government’s ability to perform its traditional functions.”386 It
rests on several specific policy concerns acknowledged by a number of
courts. First and most important, immunity from suit avoids “‘unwarranted
timidity’ on the part of those engaged in the public’s business.”387 Second, it
“ensure[s] that talented candidates [are] not deterred by the threat of
damages suits from entering public service.”388 Third, it prevents litigation
from distracting these talented employees from their duties.389 In trying to
determine whether actors qualify for such immunity, the Supreme Court
has emphasized the actors’ objectives. If “working for the government in
pursuit of government objectives,” the actors are “principally concerned
with enhancing the public good” and are much more likely to get immunity.390
B. Statutory Implications
The statutory landscape for classic executive agencies and independent
regulatory commissions is clear: To put it simply, they are federal agencies
under most statutory definitions of an agency. Thus, they are federal
agencies able to sue in federal court and are subject to the APA (and
FOIA). By contrast, the picture for boundary organizations other than
regulatory commissions is anything but clear. In a report on government
corporations and some other boundary entities, the GAO needed four pages
of charts to explain which of fifteen statutes the entities reported they
complied with.391
This Section looks at the complicated legal terrain surrounding whether
boundary organizations can sue or be sued in federal court and whether they
must follow the APA and FOIA.392

386
387
388
389
390
391
392

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1669 (2012).
Id. at 1659 (second alteration in original).
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997).
Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 34-37.
In addition to the statutes considered by the GAO and the National Environmental Policy
Act, boundary organizations also present interesting questions under criminal law. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (defining who is a public official for purposes of “[b]ribery of public officials
and witnesses”); Id. § 666 (defining who is an agent for purposes of “[t]heft or bribery concerning
programs receiving Federal funds”).
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1. Federal Court Jurisdiction
While classic executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions can bring suit in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1345,393 boundary
organizations have generated a number of cases about the provision’s
applicability.394
Whether a boundary organization can sue under section 1345 depends on
whether that entity is “expressly authorized to sue and be sued,”395 and
whether that entity “satisfies the definition of agency provided by section
451.”396 Under section 451, “[t]he term ‘agency’ includes any department,
independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or
bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States
has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was
intended to be used in a more limited sense.”397 It is, therefore, not necessary for Congress to label a boundary organization an “agency” for that
entity to invoke jurisdiction under section 1345.398
Additionally, the phrase “corporation in which the United States has a
proprietary interest”399 includes governmental corporations whether or not
stock is issued, and excludes those in which the government’s interest is
merely “custodial or incidental.”400 Some courts have considered whether 28
U.S.C. § 1349 limits section 1345 jurisdiction and therefore whether the
government must hold a majority of a corporation’s stock in order to have
the requisite proprietary interest.401 Several courts, however, have ruled that
“section 1349 does not affect any jurisdictional grant other than that provided

393 See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced
by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of
Congress.”).
394 A similar issue arises under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B). See, e.g.,
Scott v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 406 F.3d 532, 536-37 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the Hoag
Ranches factors, developed in the § 1345 context).
395 Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ticktin, 490 U.S. 82, 85 (1989).
396 Gov’t Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Terry, 608 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1979).
397 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2006).
398 Terry, 608 F.2d at 616; see also Acron Invs., Inc. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 363 F.2d
236, 239 (9th Cir. 1966) (“An ‘independent agency’ is no less an ‘agency’ in the ordinary sense of
the word whether it is described in § 451 or not. . . . § 451 is not an all-embracing definition.”).
399 Acron Invs., 363 F.2d at 239.
400 Terry, 608 F.2d at 618.
401 See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006) (“The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil
action by or against any corporation upon the ground that it was incorporated by or under an Act
of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more than one-half of its capital stock.”).
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by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a).”402 In other words, section 1349 prevents federal
court jurisdiction if section 1345 does not apply (and if the claim being
raised does not qualify for federal question jurisdiction).
For a boundary organization such as a government corporation in which
stock has not been issued, section 1345 jurisdiction generally depends on the
nature of the government’s interest, determined by analysis of that organization’s “functions, financing, and management.”403 The Ninth Circuit, for
instance, has a six-factor test.404 It is clear, however, that an entity does not
become a governmental agency for purposes of section 1345 “simply because
it is federally chartered and regulated.”405
A number of cases explore the applicability of this jurisdictional statute.
In one of the most recent, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v.
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., the District Court rejected the argument that
the Bank (FHLB-SF) was a federal agency under section 1345.406 In that
case, the defendants sought to characterize the FHLB-SF as an agency
under section 1345 for removal to federal court. Using the six-factor framework of Hoag Ranches, the court determined that although the FHLB-SF
arguably serves a governmental interest and is an arm of the federal government under the APA, other considerations weighed against treating the
Bank as an agency407: “the government has very little involvement in the
FHLB-SF ’s management;” the Bank “receives no government money;” the
Bank “is privately owned and capitalized only by its members;” and there is
an “absence of any reference to the Banks as agencies in any statute.”408
A related issue is whether “sue and be sued” clauses in statutes governing
boundary organizations confer federal question subject matter jurisdiction
402 Terry, 608 F.2d at 620; see also Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. FDIC, 789 F.2d 313, 314
(5th Cir. 1986) (finding that the FDIC is an agency within the Terry framework); Acron Invs., 363
F.2d at 240 (holding the corporation was an agency within the meaning of § 451); Fed. Land Bank
of Columbia v. Cotton, 410 F. Supp. 169, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (“[F]ederally-chartered corporations
cannot sue or be sued in federal court merely because they are federally chartered, unless the United
States government owns 51% of the capital stock.”(citation omitted)).
403 Terry, 608 F.2d at 617.
404 Hoag Ranches v. Stockton Prod. Credit Ass’n (In re Hoag Ranches), 846 F.2d 1225, 122728 (9th Cir. 1988). The six factor test includes (1) the extent to which the alleged agency performs
a governmental function; (2) the scope of government involvement in the organization’s management; (3) whether its operations are financed by the government; (4) whether persons other than
the government have a proprietary interest in the alleged agency and whether the government’s
interest is merely custodial or incidental; (5) whether the organization is referred to as an agency
in other statutes; and (6) whether the organization is treated as an arm of the government for
other purposes, such as amenability to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 1227-28.
405 Id. at 1227.
406 Nos. 10-3039, 10-3045, 2010 WL 5394742, at *8-11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010).
407 Id.
408 Id. at *9-11.
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outside of section 1345. In American National Red Cross v. S.G., the Supreme
Court, in a split decision, held that such a clause in the Red Cross’s Charter
conferred jurisdiction in any case where the Red Cross was a party.409 A
split D.C. Circuit panel recently applied the Red Cross rule to find federal
jurisdiction in a case involving Fannie Mae because the “Fannie Mae ‘sue
and be sued’ provision expressly refers to the federal courts in a manner
similar to the Red Cross statute.”410 It is not clear that other Courts of
Appeals will agree.411
Boundary organizations face two other jurisdictional issues. The first
involves the Little Tucker Act, which permits certain claims “against the
United States, not exceeding $10,000” to be heard in the Court of Federal
Claims in the first instance and in the Federal Circuit on appeal.412 Plaintiffs often seek to invoke the Act, as it waives sovereign immunity for
damages. “[A]s long as no other specific statutory provision bars jurisdiction,” the question becomes whether a boundary organization is “‘a federal
instrumentality act[ing] within its statutory authority to carry out [the
government’s] purposes.’”413 In December 2012, the Federal Circuit transferred a case against the MWAA, an interstate compact, because it did not
qualify for Little Tucker Act jurisdiction.414 The court noted that there was
no easy test for determining what qualifies as a federal instrumentality415
and relied on the Lebron factors to evaluate the MWAA.416 The second
jurisdictional issue concerns federal corporations. Assuming the relevant
legislation does not otherwise specify, courts generally find them to be
“national citizens only, lacking state citizenship for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.”417 There is a “localization” exception if the entity’s actions are
limited to a particular state, though the exception has become “more
restrictive” in recent years.418

409
410

505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992).
Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 784
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
411 Cf. id. at 785 (noting that “two district courts have reached the contrary conclusion”).
412 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), 1346(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
413 Auction Co. of Am. v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (third alteration in original) (quoting Butz Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 619, 622 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
414 Corr v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 702 F.3d 1334, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
415 Id. at 1336.
416 See id. at 1337 (noting that, among other things, “MWAA was in large part created by, and
exercises the authority of, Virginia and the District of Columbia”).
417 Lund, supra note 20, at 340.
418 Id. at 351. National banks are, by statute, “deemed citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006).
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2. The APA and FOIA
The APA and FOIA also refer to agencies as a general category. The
APA defines “agency” as any “authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency.”419
It excludes “the Congress; the courts of the United States; the governments
of the territories or possessions of the United States; the government of the
District of Columbia” and “agencies composed of representatives of the
parties or of representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes
determined by them; courts martial and military commissions; military
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory;” and
some other entities.420
FOIA applies to any “‘agency’ . . . includ[ing] any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any
independent regulatory agency.”421 Obligations under FOIA apply to more
entities422: Congress can exempt an organization that would otherwise fall
under one of these statutes in specific legislation governing that organization.
Congress has often been more explicit about which boundary organizations are subject to the APA and FOIA than to section 1345. 423 Most
government corporations, for example, fall within FOIA’s definition of
agency unless Congress expressly exempts them.424 Fewer such corporations
must follow the APA.425 Congress’s directions, therefore, create fewer cases
about these statutes’ applicability than section 1345. If there is a dispute,
Congress’s decision will govern.426
If, however, Congress does not make an explicit decision, the courts
must determine whether the statutes apply. For example, organizations
419
420
421
422

5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
Id. (internal numbering omitted).
5 U.S.C. § 552(f ) (2012).
Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access
to Private Entities Under Public Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 31 & n.63 (1999).
423 See Beermann, supra note 20, at 173 (noting that Congress often specifies whether a government corporation is subject to the APA).
424 See Feiser, supra note 422 at 36 (“Congress intended the FOIA’s terms to be read liberally
in favor of disclosure ‘unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965))). GSEs, however, are generally not subject to
FOIA. Breger & Edles, supra note 31, at 1232.
425 Indeed, when the GAO surveyed government corporations about which of fifteen statutes
they followed, the GAO did not include the APA. U.S. GOV’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 65, at 34-37.
426 See Beermann, supra note 20, at 173, 175-76 (discussing government corporations).
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formed by interstate compacts have generated a number of cases. Some
courts, including the Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, have accepted or
assumed a “quasi-federal agency” doctrine that would subject an entity to
the APA.427 This analysis typically weighs three factors: “(1) whether the
originating compact is governed, either explicitly or implicitly, by federal
procurement regulations; (2) whether a private right of action is available
under the compact; and (3) the level of federal participation.”428 In contrast,
the Second Circuit recently reversed a district court for applying this
analysis to an agency formed by interstate compact, noting that it was
“skeptical of the validity of this judge-created concept.”429
The ultimate result for all of these statutes is similar: there are no bright
lines for boundary organizations. This ambiguity derives from a dearth of
decisions as well as inconsistency among the tests used and decisions made.
Administrative law scholars have said little about this confusion.430 They
seemingly have failed to note the Circuit split on how to analyze whether
boundary organizations are subject to the APA. Congress could clarify
which statutes apply when forming boundary organizations but does not
always do so. And when it does make decisions, it is under no obligation to
make those decisions consistent across organizations of the same type. This
is unfortunate. Given the prevalence of boundary organizations, these
statutory obligations should be more consistently applied by Congress.431

427 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n, 458 F.3d 291,
304 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (assuming, but not deciding, that the APA applied); Heard Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 18 F. App’x 438, 439-40 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying quasi-federal agency
doctrine to determine that the appellee was not a quasi-federal agency); Elcon Enters., Inc. v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 977 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (assuming, but not
deciding, that the APA applies to an interstate compact agency). The D.C. Circuit has also
adopted APA standards by reference in reviewing actions by boundary organizations. See Old
Town Trolley Tours of Wash., Inc. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 129 F.3d 201, 204 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (applying the test to an interstate compact agency).
428 Am. Trucking Ass’n, 458 F.3d at 304 n.10.
429 New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n, 609 F.3d 524, 534 (2d Cir. 2010). To
determine whether FOIA applies, courts examine whether there is “substantial federal control,”
among other factors. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank of the S.F. Med. Soc’y v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 640
F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1981). Federal “funding and supervisory activities” of recipients of
government contracts, for example, do not qualify as substantial federal control. Forsham v.
Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 181 (1980).
430 In one of the rare exceptions, Jack Beermann has argued that for government corporations,
“the choice of the corporate form should be strong evidence that Congress did not intend agency
status unless Congress locates the corporation within an agency or department.” Beermann, supra
note 20, at 175.
431 See William S. Morrow, Jr., The Case for an Interstate Compact APA, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Winter 2004, at 12, 13 (calling for an APA for interstate compacts).
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C. Governance Mechanisms
As with constitutional and statutory mandates, other mechanisms of
control fall unevenly on boundary organizations. This Section examines how
presidential directives, the budget process, and litigation authority affect
these organizations.
1. Presidential Directives
For classic executive agencies, presidential directives play an important
role in agency decisionmaking. Under Executive Order 12,866, such agencies must submit significant proposed and final rulemakings and guidance,
sometimes along with a cost-benefit analysis, to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for prior approval. 432 Although only
executive agencies have to wait for approval, all “agencies” must submit
notice of all nontrivial regulatory plans to OIRA annually.433
Some boundary organizations, such as the Commission on Civil Rights
and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, appear to comply with the
Unified Agenda reporting requirements or other directives to “agencies”;
others do not.434 For example, the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA) recently made headlines by establishing contingency fee arrangements with its lawyers to “sue several major banks over losses suffered by
insolvent credit unions.”435 Such arrangements are banned under a presidential directive for all agencies (as defined by the APA) and the Postal Service,
except for the GAO and “elements of the intelligence community.”436 The
NCUA claimed the directive did not apply to it because “it is an independent agency acting as a liquidator of failed credit unions.”437 Legal experts
seem split.438 According to one expert, Congress permitted such action by
statute by equating the agency with a “credit union” when it acts as a
liquidator.439
432 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app.
at 802-06 (2012).
433 Id. at 641-42, 644-48.
434 Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, OFF.
INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain (open drop down menu
under “Select Agency” for a list of agencies) (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
435 Cary Coglianese, When Is a Federal Agency Not a Federal Agency?, REGBLOG (Oct. 29, 2012),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2012/10/when-is-a-federal-agency-not-a-federal-agency.html.
436 Exec. Order No. 13,433, 3 C.F.R. 217, 218 (2008).
437 James V. Grimaldi & Alicia Mundy, Nice Payday for ‘Toxic’ Work, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25,
2012, at C1.
438 Id.
439 Coglianese, supra note 435.
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To help improve accountability, the White House may be able to revise
any of its directives to explicitly include independent regulatory commissions and other boundary organizations, though the legal authority to do so
is disputed.440 In 2011, President Obama did order independent regulatory
commissions and boards to comply with the “general requirements [of
Executive Order 15,563] . . . concerning public participation, integration
and innovation, flexible approaches, and science” and to issue a plan like
executive agencies to “promote retrospective analysis of rules . . . in
accordance with what has been learned.”441 These requirements could be
extended to all boundary organizations.442 To eliminate any questions over
legality, Congress could pass legislation allowing the President to extend
regulatory oversight tools to such organizations.
Alternatively, the White House could dedicate resources to overseeing
particular types of boundary organizations separately. According to CRS,
the Bureau of the Budget (OMB’s predecessor) “was instrumental in the
passage of the [Government Corporation Control Act of 1945], and created
a separate office to oversee the formation, and monitor the operation, of
government corporations on behalf of the President.”443 Although no such
office exists today,444 its history suggests the feasibility of such an institutional arrangement.
2. Budget Process
Almost all executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions
are funded at least in part by regular appropriations. Such appropriations
allow for presidential and congressional oversight through the presidential
budget proposal and the actual congressional appropriations.445 A “short
440

See VIVIAN S. C HU & DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42720, PRESREVIEW OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKING: LEGAL
(2012) (“[T]here may be lingering questions as to whether the President has the legal
authority to extend requirements of the executive order to the IRCs without . . . congressional
action.”). I have written in support of proposed legislation that permits the President to extend
regulatory review to independent regulatory commissions and boards. Letter from Jonathan H.
Adler et al., Admin. Law Professors, to Senators Joe Lieberman and Susan Collins on S. 3468,
The Indep. Agency Regulatory Analysis Act ( Jan. 2, 2013) (on file with author).
441 Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256, 257 (2012).
442 Cf. Datla & Revesz, supra note 23, at 824-25 (arguing that because all independent agencies
are somewhat executive, the President can exercise control absent an explicit congressional bar).
443 KOSAR, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, supra note 62, at 10.
444 Id. at 10 & n.41.
445 See Barkow, supra note 23, at 43 (“One way to limit political control through budgetary
oversight is to allow agencies to submit budget proposals directly to Congress without having to
go through OMB and thus the President. . . . [Another way is for Congress to] allow agencies to
submit their budget requests concurrently to OMB and Congress, which eliminates the President’s
IDENTIAL
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list” of executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions are
entirely self-funded.446 The list would be considerably longer, however, if
boundary organizations outside of independent regulatory commissions
were included as well. Indeed, as Part II demonstrates, agency designers
often prefer to make organizations “off budget.”
Just as restrictions on the removal of agency leaders bring insulation, so
does independence from traditional funding mechanisms.447 Congress could
impose political control through funding and play to partisan preferences
for off-budget entities by providing nominal appropriations to an organization—which could be more than paid back through investment returns, user
fees, or other mechanisms.448 OPIC would be an example as it makes money
for the federal government. The existence of nominal congressional appropriations for administrative expenses helps foster congressional oversight.449
3. Litigation Authority
The Attorney General usually controls the federal government’s litigation;450 such control “brings [agencies] closer to the administration position.”451 Yet Congress can change this default by statute452 and sometimes
does so for boundary entities. For example, the Dodd–Frank Act gives the
new CFPB independent litigating authority in the lower courts (though the
agency must consult with the Attorney General) and the ability to request
such authority in front of the Supreme Court.453 Usually, these statutes
ability to change agency policy before Congress sees the agency’s original proposal.”); Daugirdas,
supra note 22, at 521 (detailing how Congress provides instructions to the World Bank through
appropriations riders).
446 By one count, the “short list” includes only the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Comptroller of the Currency, Farm Credit Administration, Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation,
FDIC, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, FHFA, Federal Prisons Industries Inc.,
Federal Reserve Board, NCUA, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. Note, supra note 56, at 1823
& n.12; see also LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 19, at 120 (eliminating CFPB from the list); Barkow,
supra note 23, at 44 (adding PCAOB to the list).
447 Barkow, supra note 23, at 44.
448 See KOPPELL, supra note 19, at 128.
449 ILIAS A KHTAR, supra note 69, at 5-7. To the extent that boundary organizations do not
rely on traditional appropriations, other mechanisms of oversight can fill the gaps. For example,
the Senate may delay confirming nominees to organizations that are “off budget” more than
nominees to organizations funded by regular appropriations.
450 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516–519 (2006).
451 Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J.
252, 254.
452 Devins, supra note 57, at 263-64 (recognizing that Congress has the right to make exceptions to the Attorney General’s control). The Justice Department sometimes arranges for agencies
to handle certain aspects of litigation.
453 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a)-(e) (2012).
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restrict such authority to actions in the lower courts and give power to the
Solicitor General at the highest level of litigation. Most independent
regulatory commissions and boards, for example, “have the final say in
litigation until a case reaches the Supreme Court.”454 Only a few organizations, including the FCC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have
independent litigating authority at the Supreme Court. 455 Some others,
such as the FTC, have such power if the Solicitor General “refuses to
defend their position.”456
Sometimes, boundary organizations claim independent litigating authority
despite immense political pressure not to. For instance, the Postal Service,
by a 6-5 vote of its Governors, refused to withdraw a motion to represent
itself in the D.C. Circuit in a 1993 rate-setting conflict with the Postal Rate
Commission. 457 The District Court for the District of Columbia then
protected the Governors through a preliminary injunction against their
removal.458 According to Neal Devins, the Postal Service needs independent
legal authority in rate-setting disputes because such “disputes pit the Postal
Service against the Postal Rate Commission, an independent agency whose
litigation is entrusted to the Attorney General.”459
Additionally, while litigation authority is usually defined in terms of the
levels of the federal courts, some boundary organizations have more unusual
arrangements. For example, while the Justice Department represents the
Export-Import Bank in federal court, the boundary organization controls its
litigation abroad.460 To the extent that political control over a boundary
organization is not desired, for social welfare or other reasons, independent
litigating authority functions to provide some insulation—at least if challenges are likely to be brought in court.461 Congress, however, must explicitly
provide for this authority.

454
455
456

Devins, supra note 57, at 258.
Barkow, supra note 23, at 55 n.215.
Devins, supra note 57, at 275. A larger group of agencies, including the Agriculture
Department, can file a petition for certiorari. Id. at 275 n.105.
457 Devins, supra note 16, at 310.
458 Mail Order Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
459 Devins, supra note 16, at 306-07.
460 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1) (2012).
461 See Barkow, supra note 23, at 55-56 (noting that independent litigation authority allows
agencies to ensure that mandates are properly followed); cf. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The
Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1374-75
(2000) (concluding that DOJ control over litigation has some consequences but its effects are hard
to quantify and are shaped by other factors).

922

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 841

D. Reconsidering “Classic” Agencies
Administrative law depends, at least implicitly, on a cramped view of the
administrative state, composed of executive agencies and independent
regulatory commissions.462 Recent work posits that the administrative state
cannot be divided neatly into these two categories. Kirti Datla and Richard
Revesz argue that “all agencies should be regarded as executive and seen as
falling on a spectrum from more independent to less independent.” 463 In
other words, agencies exist along a horizontal continuum of political control.
Under that view, the President should be able to direct agency decisions
subject to Article II, unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise.464
Political control could, however, also function vertically, between federal
and state actors or federal and foreign players, as well as on other dimensions that drive agency structure. By viewing boundary organizations as
important parts of the bureaucracy, this Section reconsiders several core
issues of bureaucratic politics and administrative law. Drawing on the
positive and normative theory in Part II, it examines both where boundary
organizations should fit within the doctrine and how the doctrine might
change for traditional entities.
To start, boundary organizations are typically absent from core administrative law doctrine. Deference doctrines rely on purely federal entities but
do not distinguish among these entities. In Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education and Research v. United States, the Court unanimously rejected the
proposition that the Treasury Department deserved less deference for its
interpretation of an ambiguous statute through notice and comment tax
rulemaking: “[W]e have expressly [recognized] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.”465 Some
members of the Court have suggested that independent regulatory commissions might receive less deference under “arbitrary and capricious” review of
section 706(2)(A) of the APA, because of their apparent distance from

462 Cf. Aman, supra note 20, at 92 (“Administrative law is directly linked to the dominant
theory of the state in vogue at any given point in time.”).
463 Datla & Revesz, supra note 23, at 769. They include some boundary institutions described
in Part I, but exclude many of them from their analysis. See id. at 784 n.90.
464 Id. at 862.
465 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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politics. 466 This proposition has gained traction only (slightly) in the
academic commentary but was forcefully rejected by the Court’s majority.467
Instead, deference doctrines draw largely from the perceived institutional
characteristics of agencies, notably their accountability and expertise—at
least relative to the courts. Chevron deference rests mostly on political
accountability to the President;468 Skidmore deference draws primarily on
expertise.469 To the extent that the former is more forgiving to agency
action than the latter, we see again the allure of political control. How do
boundary organizations fit in?470 On accountability, deference does not seem
warranted because these entities appear less responsive to political overseers. 471 In addition, if states are less accountable to the President, 472
federal–state hybrids similarly may be insufficiently accountable to the
President. And because the courts avoid distinguishing among specific
agencies, it seems likely that courts would bar such entities as a group from
falling under Chevron. 473 On the other hand, the federal component of
federal–state and other hybrids may provide enough presidential and
congressional oversight to warrant deference. Of course, it is an empirical
question: if deference depends on accountability, it would be important to
figure out if agencies, whether classic or boundary, are in fact accountable to
the President.

466 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1830 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[The FCC]’s comparative freedom from ballot-box control makes it all the more
important that courts review its decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable provisions of
the law—including law requiring that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.”).
467 Id. at 1817 (Scalia, J.).
468 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
469 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1944).
470 Abbe Gluck and Emily Stabile have examined how states might fit in. Gluck, supra note
25; Emily Stabile, Federal Deference to State Agency Implementation of Federal Law (working
draft). Aaron Cooper has looked at how private parties (in implementing federal statutes) might
be incorporated. Aaron R. Cooper, Note, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an
Era of Private Governance, 99 GEO. L.J. 1431 (2011).
471 See KOPPELL, supra note 19, at 46 (claiming that hybrid entities are “somewhat less likely
to satisfy the principal’s preferences”); Froomkin, supra note 13, at 607 (arguing government
corporations are less accountable to the President).
472 See Gluck, supra note 25, at 602-03 (arguing that states are less accountable but noting
ways states could promote accountability); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation
of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 210 (1997) (arguing that delegation to
states “places policymaking discretion in the hands of state officials for whom many federal
citizens do not vote” and therefore that state officials “are unlikely to hear the political voices of
out-of-state citizens when policymaking discretion is exercised”).
473 Courts have, for example, generally refused to extend Chevron to the states. Gluck, supra
note 25, at 611 (citing Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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Deference does seem warranted on expertise. Here, courts do distinguish among agencies. When it comes to state agencies, courts have cited to
their expertise in reviewing actions deferentially.474 If political actors create
boundary organizations due to competence as described in Part II, those
entities should be presumed to have relevant expertise.475
The more interesting question is not how well boundary organizations
comply with traditional rationales but rather how such organizations might
shape them. Boundary organizations suggest more encompassing notions of
both accountability and expertise. Political accountability, under Chevron, is
about responsiveness to the President.476 This focus is understandable if
most agencies are classic executive agencies or independent regulatory
commissions. But considering boundary organizations, it may be more
accurate to think of accountability to a wider or more vigilant set of actors.477
Entities at the federal–state border, for instance, are arguably accountable to
more political actors whose jobs depend on voters. Yet boundary organizations created by political branches to avoid political control are probably less
accountable.
On expertise, if agencies are created in part for political reasons, agency
structures of all kinds cannot be removed from politics. In other words,
agencies may become experts in particular policy areas, but they are not
designed by technocrats. Boundary organizations may make these partisan
preferences more visible on a range of agency structures.
Under the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,
considerable attention is paid to congressional intent. To qualify for Chevron
deference when interpreting an ambiguous statute, an agency must have
been delegated the authority to act with the force of law. 478 Boundary
organizations demonstrate that congressional intent is not dependent on
agency structure. Mead also weighs procedure heavily. Not only does

474 See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Sanford, 494 F.3d 439, 447 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n
order of a state commission may deserve a measure of respect in view of the commission’s
experience [and] expertise . . . .”); Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir.
1993) (finding that the state agency warranted deference for its expertise and familiarity with the
program at issue).
475 Some courts have applied Skidmore to the states. Gluck, supra note 25, at 611 (citing BellSouth, 494 F.3d at 449).
476 This cramped notion of accountability to the President supports not only Chevron but
arguably also the separation of powers doctrine. Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and
the Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 525 (2011). If courts considered accountability
to a wider set of actors, they would presumably be less troubled by some boundary entities.
477 Cf. Gluck, supra note 25, at 602-03 (analyzing the complexities of state accountability to
the federal government and the public).
478 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
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Congress have to delegate to the agency the authority to act with the force
of law, the agency must actually use that authority.479 There is thus theoretically both an ex ante examination about congressional delegation and an ex
post analysis of the decisionmaking process. In practice, however, the latter
is emphasized. Since Mead, notice and comment rulemaking essentially
guarantees Chevron (as opposed to Skidmore) deference if the statute does
not compel a particular interpretation.480 Procedure has become the manifestation of congressional intent.
To the extent that boundary organizations use a wider range of tools to
make decisions than the rulemaking and adjudication categories entrenched
in the APA,481 they may have a harder time qualifying for deference under
Mead. Boundary organizations should also make actions by traditional
agencies that do not easily fall into the APA divisions more visible. The
MWAA’s running of airports brings to mind the DOE’s running of laboratories, for example. Administrative law may therefore devote too much
attention to rulemaking and adjudication.
At the same time, boundary entities suggest that the Mead analysis, even
theoretically, may not be compelling. Boundary organizations demonstrate
how tenuous congressional intent can be. The account of agency creation in
Part II illustrates that Congress is just one player in the negotiation over
agency form. Additionally, these entities make policy decisions using more
than the traditional rulemaking and adjudication forms—the Court in Mead
may have relied on a method of decisionmaking that is not how most
decisions get made. In the end, boundary organizations may encourage
more attention to the match between structure and delegated authority as
well as to the procedures used to complete the delegated task.
Finally, the prevalence of boundary organizations undercuts the unitary
executive theory. That theory requires that all executive authority vest in
the President, who must take care that all the laws are faithfully executed.
Although the theory’s proponents tend to flag concerns with independent
regulatory commissions and boards, they should also worry about the
boundary organizations described in Part I. There are two options: adopt
the unitary executive theory and dismantle considerable sections of the
modern administrative state or adopt a more functional approach to executive

479
480
481

Id.
Id.
LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 19, at 130-32; cf. CAROLINE N. BROWN ET AL., T HE
EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 11, 14 (2006) (noting that interstate compacts do more than address “common boundary
disputes” and that more recent compacts engage in considerable rulemaking activities).
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power and work to make sure that boundary organizations are sufficiently
accountable.
CONCLUSION
The federal bureaucracy is not confined to the Cabinet departments and
freestanding agencies in the Executive Branch. The remainder is not,
however, stuffed into a “Headless Branch,” as Time magazine suggested
nearly fifty years ago.482 There are federal entities in each of the three
branches as well as at the interstices between any two branches and even
among all three. Some organizations straddle the federal government, on
one hand, and foreign countries, states, or tribes, on the other. Some have
both a public and private side. The complex map of the administrative state
is not new; hybrid structures date back to the founding of the country.
Despite this longstanding architecture of the bureaucracy, administrative
law focuses almost entirely on the components directly under the President
and the independent regulatory commissions and boards in the no man’s
land between the President and Congress. This focus creates a number of
problems. It constructs a fictional organizational chart and prevents systematic consideration of large and important swaths of the administrative state.
Relatedly, it restricts the analysis of those swaths that do appear on the
artificial chart. Despite these problems, the focus survives. After all,
establishing a dichotomy (or continuum) of executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions provides tractability to consider complicated questions of institutional design and policy selection.
In this Article, I have tried to retain some tractability while widening
the lens on the administrative state. Most simply, I have identified and
classified some of the missing federal bureaucracy along the borders of more
conventional categories. That classification exercise is mostly a static one—
where those missing parts currently reside—but it also considers agencies’
movement within these categories. In addition, I have theorized about why
political actors would create such organizations. Under the positive analysis,
boundary organizations are common outcomes of the agency design process.
These organizations have uneven effects on efficiency and democratic
legitimacy. Social welfare may not always trump accountability in these
alternative agency structures, and in some cases there might not be a
tradeoff at all between the two (partly because both are sacrificed). Finally, I
have examined the legal issues surrounding these other entities and how
these entities might shape already established law and governance of federal
482

The Headless Branch, TIME MAG., July 31, 1964, at 57.
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agencies. There is still considerable work to be done, including testing the
positive theory, developing the normative implications in greater detail, and
proposing more definite legal conclusions.
To return to the postal service, in its modern form, it is a paragon
boundary organization. If the USPS were not missing from (or pushed to
the margins of) the artificial organization chart of the modern administrative state, we could have more discussion about why the political branches
create government corporations and why they establish executive agencies
or independent regulatory commissions. We could have more analysis of the
efficiency and legitimacy of government corporations and the social welfare
and accountability of executive agencies. We could also better assess how
the Constitution and agency statutes justify and govern agency action—of
all kinds. We could have a broader view of administrative law to match the
complexity and breadth of the administrative state.

